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# West Europe Report

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23 March 1984

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## VOGEL REASSERTS SPD'S LOYALTY TO NATO

Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 8 Feb 84 p 8

[Article: "Vogel: The SPD Stands Behind NATO. Head of Fraction Wants To Clear Up 'Misunderstandings' in Canada and U.S."]

[Text] Ottawa (ddp) - Hans-Jochen Vogel, chairman of the SPD fraction, concluded his talks in the Canadian capital Ottawa by emphasizing the SPD's unchanged loyalty to the Western alliance. He also pledged support for the peace initiative of Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau and suggested that its scope be expanded to include arms control. In addition to Trudeau, Vogel also met in Ottawa with Foreign Minister Allan McEachen and leading representatives of the New Democratic Party, Canada's counterpart to the SPD. On Tuesday he traveled on to Washington.

Vogel said that the goal of his trip was to dispel "rather numerous misunderstandings" and "misinformation" in America regarding the SPD's attitude toward NATO after the missile decision at the SPD Congress in Cologne was misinterpreted as a rejection of the alliance by the SPD. He pointed out that discussions concerning further development of NATO strategy were also taking place in other countries. Of prime importance in all this was the question of how long the public would continue to accept the concept of early first-strike use of nuclear weapons. There was also increasing doubt as to whether a continuation of the nuclear arms race could actually lead to greater security. Vogel said it was time that the superpowers in particular return to the negotiating table. Following the first positive indications from the Stockholm disarmament conference, greater efforts and more progress were needed.

His interlocutor Trudeau assured Vogel that it was good for a loyal partner in the alliance, and moreover a neighbor of the key ally, the U.S., to make efforts to initiate talks with the East, including the GDR. At the same time he conceded that differing opinions existed on how NATO strategy should develop. The SPD itself, he said, did not yet have an alternative to the present strategy, but did have papers and ideas which could contribute to its development, whereby the defensive nature of the alliance should receive greater emphasis. "Ostpolitik" has proven so convincing that it is now a non-partisan policy with the head of the CSU, Franz-Josef Strauss, as one of its newest supporters.

A high level official in the Canadian foreign ministry explained the basis of Trudeau's initiative by saying that the Prime Minister sensed increasing concern about the lack of a political framework and of common basic assumptions and goals between East and West, while the dialogue at the Vienna and Geneva negotiations has been reduced to technical matters. Trudeau never left any doubt that he did not want to become personally involved in the missile negotiations between the United States and the USSR and clearly indicated Canada's firm support of the NATO two-track decision. Trudeau's plan for a conference involving the five nuclear powers has up to now struck a moderately positive chord only with China. At the conference a kind of quota system for distribution of the overall nuclear potential would be agreed upon.

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## SPD STUDY URGES STRONGER CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE

Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 2 Feb 84 p 5

[Article: "SPD: Strengthen Conventional Defense. Commission Proposes Militia System Among Other Measures/Vogel for a Tank-Free Zone"]

[Text] Bonn (dpa)--Andreas von Buelow, chairman of the commission on security policy of the SPD's executive committee, presented proposals Wednesday in Bonn for further developing defense strategy. These proposals are based on a build-up of conventional defensive weapons in order to eliminate the need for nuclear weapons. The former parliamentary state secretary in the department of defense feels that his commission will be able to present its finalized proposals to the SPD Congress in 1986.

In view of the expected decrease by about 100,000 in the number of persons eligible for military service in the FRG in the 1990's, von Buelow advocated a 400,000 man army with no increase in the period of service, divisions of guest workers or conscription of women into combat units. A militia comprising reservists trained in anti-tank defense would be stationed along the border with the GDR and Czechoslovakia in a strip 50 to 70 km wide. However, all army border units would remain where they are as long as no breakthrough was achieved in the disarmament negotiations. The other army units would be reduced to core units whose ranks would be filled with reservists only in the case of an increase in tensions.

At the same time, tactical nuclear weapons should be withdrawn, suggested von Buelow, and replaced with conventional anti-tank weapons or mines. After an "appropriate period of time" the nuclear first-strike strategy could be abandoned. Then as now a certain minimum number of nuclear weapons on the Western side would be necessary, but not the American medium-range Pershing 2 missiles now stationed in the FRG. Some land-based systems and some U.S. sea-based cruise missiles would be adequate.

The West should encourage the Warsaw Pact nations, and the Soviet Union in particular, to establish similar defensive structures. Von Buelow

spoke of an attempt to organize a security partnership between East and West. Soviet interests in the next decades will be better served by cooperation than confrontation, he said.

CDU spokesman, Wolter von Tiesenhausen, said in regard to the SPD study in Bonn that the Social Democrats always fell victim to the same illusions. The SPD failed to recognize the military potential of the Soviet Union and tried to meet the very real threat of the Red Army with weak-kneed formulas.

Hans-Jochen Vogel, chairman of the SPD fraction in the Bundestag, thinks steps toward conventional disarmament in Europe with the goal of a more even balance of power are feasible. Vogel told the Coblenz RHEIN-ZEITUNG that this would have to include an agreement between the two blocks on a strip of land in which no large tank divisions would be permitted.

Regarding new defense strategies, Vogel said that the nuclear threshold could be raised considerably if satisfactory results on conventional disarmament could be achieved at the negotiations in Vienna. An even balance of power could be achieved not by conventional counterarmament by the West, but by disarmament by the East. He advocated a non-aggression treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Pact which would include already existing agreements renouncing the use of force.

#### Feldmann: Limit Arms Exports

Olaf Feldmann, FDP security expert and Bundestag deputy, suggested limiting German arms exports to the NATO member nations. Feldmann said Wednesday that this was possibly the best way to prevent future sales of arms to nations outside the Western alliance.

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## SPD PROPOSES NATO SECURITY PARTNERSHIP WITH EAST

Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 3 Feb 84 p 5

[Article by Editorial Staff in Bonn: "SPD: Break Automatic Cycle of Rearmament. Executive Committee Proposes NATO Security Partnership with East"]

[Text] ub. Bonn, February 2--The executive committee of the SPD, in a resolution to be presented at the SPD Congress in May, is advocating a new NATO strategy. The resolution, now adopted, which was formulated primarily by Egon Bahr, Horst Ehmke and Hans Apel, states that in view of the changing problems and dangers involved, the development of NATO strategy must include the goal of systematically counteracting political confrontation and the mechanics of the arms race.

A treaty of non-aggression between NATO and the Warsaw Pact within the scope of the Stockholm conference is recommended as one practical step toward the goal of a security partnership in Europe. This resolution of the executive committee also encourages negotiations on the Palme Commission report's suggestion for a limited 300 km wide (150 km on either side) zone free of nuclear weapons as a way to initiate the process of "denuclearization," however "conventional stability" would be necessary for this to occur.

The security expert for the social democrats, Egon Bahr, told the press in Bonn in regard to the executive committee's resolution, that the SPD plans to continue to lead discussions within NATO on a new strategy. The newly adopted resolution was a framework, he said, to be filled in between now and 1986, covering a full range of positions from that of Hans Apel to that of Oskar Lafontaine.

Concerning the suggestions published the day before made by Andreas von Buelow, the chairman of the commission on security policy of the executive committee, Bahr remarked that they represented a personal opinion, were fascinating, "extremely interesting" and "worthy of discussion." Von Buelow pleaded for further development of a defense strategy based on strengthening conventional defenses in border units in order



to eliminate the need for the early use of nuclear weapons. In von Buelow's opinion, a minimum number of nuclear weapons would be required on the Western side, but not the Pershing 2 systems now installed in the FRG.

The resolution of the party's executive committee is based on a report by the working group for security policy presented at the extraordinary party congress in Cologne in November 1983 and associated resolutions. Point 1 establishes that the FRG will remain bound, politically and militarily, to the European Community and NATO, finding security only with its partners and allies and not without them. Pursuit of a peaceful European order based on a security partnership must take into account the existing situation and the strategy which has been adopted and "which is valid until the alliance adopts a new one."

Any consideration of a limited nuclear conflict must be rejected, in the view of the executive committee. The trend toward further development of nuclear weapons as weapons of war must be stopped; they must be returned to the role of strategic defensive weapons and reduced in amount to the minimum necessary for deterrence. Short- and medium-range nuclear weapons systems must be eliminated by both sides through controlled negotiations, and where necessary must be replaced by conventional weapons systems which are feasible based on today's technology. "Conventional stability" must be established at as low a level as possible through negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact based on a realistic analysis of the threat to both sides.

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## SCHMUECKLE SEES RISKS IN 'STRATEGY DISCUSSIONS'

Zurich DIE WELTWOCHEN in German 23 Feb 84 p 7

[Article by Gerd Schmueckle: "The Dangers of a Debate on Strategy at This Time"]

[Text] The author is considered one of the authoritative experts on military affairs and strategy in Europe. He started out as a free-lance journalist before joining the Bundeswehr on 1956. From 1957 to 1962, he was spokesman of the defense ministry and subsequently held the post of military adviser to the FRG's ambassador to NATO in Paris and Brussels for 4 years. Following various command assignments, Schmueckle was promoted to the rank of 3-star general and the post of director of the international military staff in Brussels. When he left that post he was promoted to the rank of 4-star general and the post of deputy supreme commander of allied forces in Europe. General Kiessling, who was recently dismissed unjustly, was a successor of Schmueckle's—who spoke out in favor of Kiessling throughout the entire affair.

German politicians are so vehemently pushing for a debate of strategy within NATO that it almost makes one think the alliance was led by Germans and that everyone else had to follow their lead. Germany, which once was the nation of poets and thinkers and then became the nation of scientists, seems now to have turned into the nation of military strategists. The noises being made are shrill as though a German-type fundamentalism were in the offing. Deterrent strategy is being lambasted although it has a proven record of having prevented war. A new NATO strategy is needed—that is something the German strategic thinkers are agreed on.

They can be divided into three groups: There are the disarmament strategists who publicly admit to wanting to "undermine" the Western defense posture. Another way in which this argument is put is that the FRG should quit NATO. Oskar Lafontaine, one of the leaders of this group, has said in effect that he would rather be a vintner in Soviet Georgia than dead.

Then, there are those strategists who would accept capitulation and foreign occupation and would then force the enemy to withdraw again by refusing to work—a kind of work-by-rule strategy.

And finally, there are those strategists who would permit the enemy to enter the country provided he mounts an attack and would then demoralize him with the aid of small-sized combat teams and so put him to rout.

These military strategists are thinking in terms of capitulation and warfare strategies. They have not been able to adapt their thinking to war prevention strategy. Some of them are—quite seriously—looking for alternatives to NATO strategy. But in view of the existing military situation in Europe these alternatives turn out to be useless. Compared to the deterrent strategy of the Western alliance, they might as well have been devised in the 19th century. But there are some other strategic thinkers who are clever. They are calling for a debate on strategy within NATO, knowing full well that NATO might be ruined in the process. They are aware of the cost involved in such a debate. NATO would not survive a second debate of this kind—they hope.

#### Only General de Gaulle Said No

The last debate on strategy took place in the sixties. It was requested by the then American Secretary of Defense McNamara. He thought the debate was needed because the Soviets had amassed a substantial nuclear weapons capability. There appeared to be a greater threat to America than before and McNamara felt that massive retaliation was no longer credible.

A public debate on strategy in America had preceded this. Military theorists thought they had at last discovered the best of all possible strategic axioms—a system that guaranteed certain success as in the case of a game of chance. They announced that war was not only manageable but winnable; it could be "escalated" and "de-escalated" at will. There were ways of introducing "pauses" between the conventional and nuclear phases of a war. "Thresholds" could be identified that might lead from conventional to nuclear war and back again. The war theorists of the 18th century had thought along similar lines up to the time that Napoleon demonstrated to them in very practical terms what real war was like.

In the mid-sixties, it became clear that much of what had been published in America up to that time had merely been meant to get the Europeans attuned to the new strategy. In Europe there were plenty of people who soon became true believers. Only General de Gaulle said no right away—in no uncertain terms, angrily, haughtily. He was afraid that the debate was only being used to punch holes in the absoluteness of the American nuclear umbrella protecting Europe. In addition, General de Gaulle was extremely suspicious of war theorists who had no practical military experience whatever. He left no doubt but that the price to be paid for such a strategy debate might well be France.

But McNamara stuck to his guns, insisting that a task force be formed to work out a new military strategy for NATO. The diverse opinions represented within the group quickly led to confrontation—the Americans being faced by a "European front." The British mediated between the two sides and the French refused to participate in the discussions. Urged on by Belgian Foreign Minister Harmel, the Europeans asked that a political strategy be added to the military strategy. This, however, the Americans did not like and the confrontation grew in intensity, placing a dangerous strain on the alliance. The task force thereupon decided to broaden the ministers' new strategy guidelines to such an extent that they would leave lots of room for maneuvering. Future changes in strategy could thus be taken care of in an evolutionary fashion—without having to debate strategy every time. That was the basic idea and the Europeans managed to some extent to stand their ground against McNamara.

There were two weaknesses to McNamara's positions./First/, they were based on artificial assumptions far removed from any real conception of war and /secondly/, they called for NATO superiority in all military areas—particularly in the conventional field. But that was not the case. Thus, the concept that an aggressor could be brought to his senses, if threatened with the next-higher level of escalation was something like military alchemy. Successful threats, after all, can only be made, if one is superior to the enemy.

#### An Alliance Based on a Strategic Lie

For the time being then, the new strategy was a matter of spurious labeling. But there were grounds for hope at the time that NATO's conventional inferiority would soon be overcome. But the opposite happened. The Americans withdrew one of their divisions from Germany and brought it back only once a year for maneuvers. But things went from bad to worse. General de Gaulle removed all of his armed forces from NATO—ground, naval and air forces. From that point on, NATO planners could look on the French forces only as a bonus and no longer as an element they could count on. Within a year, all NATO installations had to be removed from French soil. Thereby, the alliance lost its most important operational hinterland for defense purposes—being restricted to a ridiculously narrow defense area in Central Europe. Even more so than prior to the strategy debate nuclear weapons were needed to maintain deterrent credibility. From then on, the alliance continued to exist on the basis of a strategic lie.

The Europeans were not prepared to make up for what they had lost through the removal of the French forces. It was only the American supreme commanders who were responsible for the defense of Europe who kept looking for ways out. They went through the painful experience of witnessing the disaster which McNamara's military concepts were causing in Vietnam. Positions began to be rethought in Washington, too. It was clear that the alliance could not live a strategy lie over the long term. The Americans started looking for a temporary solution. At some later date, they hoped, the defensive weaknesses of Europe would be overcome by technical means.

That temporary solution became reality when General Alexander Haig was appointed SACEUR. He developed a large-scale reinforcement program for Western Europe: the conventional sector was to be reinforced strongly and rapidly by ground and air units. If a serious crisis arose, the Soviets would understand such a signal—at least long enough so as not to enter into a direct confrontation with the United States. The Haig program created new instrumentalities for crisis management. At the same time, he stationed a U.S. brigade in Northern Germany where no American troops had ever been before. These actions of Haig's made it clear that the Americans stood ready to defend the entire FRG in case of an attack—from the north to the south of Germany. For the first time since its adoption, the new strategy filled out with improved military strength.

Wherever deterrent systems are operational, specific weapons technologies determine strategy and not as previously the more or less brilliant ideas of generals. With the aid of weapons technology alone military deterrence can be maintained and balance can be created—no matter whether there is rearmament or disarmament. At this time, both East and West stand on the threshold of introducing new weapons technologies. These force the politicians once again to decide whether they wish to think and plan along the lines of deterrent or of warfare strategy.

#### Destabilized Balance

Precision weapons are already in existence which provide almost perfect target accuracy over short, medium and long distances. Even the sea-based missiles—which were not as reliable until now—are part of this development pattern. Radar guidance systems permit these missiles to change course in flight in order to elude the air defenses. All weapons systems—even the largest ones—are becoming more mobile. The distinction between conventional and nuclear explosive force is becoming blurred. We have by now succeeded in reducing the nuclear explosive force required to hit a target by a factor of 5,000. Contrary to public opinion, nuclear weapons will be less of a threat to the population and to nature in the future than they were in the past. Targets can be attacked with nuclear weapons without damaging the environment. Neutron weapons have been developed. It seems that defense against global ballistic missiles with the aid of super laser weapons and guided energy weapons is now possible.

Where does this lead ? Pessimists believe that these new weapons will destabilize the balance but they cannot really tell you how. They believe that the danger of war is now greater because the other side would have to accept a first strike—but that is the way it has been all along. As long as a retaliatory strike is assured—and the mobility of the new systems guarantees that—deterrence will continue to be credible.

No one can say with any certainty exactly what plans the Soviets have for the new technologies. But by now they, too, have come to the realization that it is in their own interest to design the kinds of military systems that will deter war. Their experienced military experts no longer think



along the simplistic lines prescribed by existing Soviet military regulations. Western military literature has had an impact on them, too. German strategists are calling for popular consensus on NATO strategy which, they say, no longer exists. But in truth the overwhelming majority of the population is in favor of NATO. That is the politically decisive factor—and not strategy. Deterrent strategies and flag-waving patriotism or grand emotion simply do not go together. All that belongs to the past. In former times, strategy was expressed in war plans conceived during peacetime. Of course, it used to be debated by just a very few people. The American population gave its consent for the war against Hitler Germany; but no one would have dreamed of making the strategic plans dependent upon the consent of the population. The point today is to obtain the population's consent to a modern military system that is not conceived in terms of inciting war but of preserving peace. The debate on strategic planning will continue to be carried on—as before—by just a very few. The fact is that deterrence calls for ice-cold rationality far removed from all manifestations of mass hysteria—particularly in the event of a serious crisis.

#### To Strengthen Defense

Today, too, a strategy debate within NATO would cost us dearly—how dearly no one can tell. Nonetheless, such a debate may be forced upon us because a new generation has taken over the reins. But this new generation will probably no more take Bismarck's maxim to heart than any of its predecessors to the effect that stupid people learn from experience whereas smart people learn from the experience of others.

General Rogers, the present SACEUR, has already pointed out the right course—which does not include a debate on strategy. He wants to use the new technologies to turn the conventional spectrum of the NATO defense system into a deterrent in the real sense of the word. This would make the war-preventing capability of the system totally credible for the first time ever. A more reliable deterrent system, less dependent on nuclear weapons, would emerge and defense might become stronger than the attack potential. This would not call for more but probably for fewer weapons than we now have. Target accuracy makes it possible to reduce the number of weapons. Simultaneously, NATO arms control strategy would have to come up with new ideas which not only take existing weapons systems into account but also the upcoming systems which have already gone through the development stage. But that is another subject and a big one at that.

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## STRATEGY DEBATE LOW-KEYED AT MUNICH CONFERENCE

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 17 Feb 84 p 6

[Article by Kurt Becker: "Calm Seas for Alliance"]

[Text] Munich, in February—Not a single participant in the annual military affairs conference held here last weekend predicted that a new and ~~fatal~~ crisis threatened the Western alliance in the near future. That has not happened in some time and it is hard to say whether it did happen because the participants were genuinely worried or because they did not wish to dramatize the political situation excessively. Since this meeting of the political, diplomatic and military establishment of the most important member states of the alliance has always been a reliable barometer, one may assume that the alliance's state of health is passable at the moment.

This estimate is supported by three factors which were repeatedly mentioned at the Munich conference. First of all, the strain on the alliance caused primarily by the furious debate on arms modernization in the FRG has disappeared. Secondly, by proposing to the Soviets that they engage in a dialogue, President Reagan has to a large extent complied with the wishes of the West Europeans with regard to this controversial issue. And thirdly, the changeover in Soviet leadership from Andropov to Chernenko has not raised any fears of a decided Soviet policy shift or a hardening of the Kremlin line.

Thus, there was an unaccustomed consensus in Munich. Ranging from Vice President Bush's speech—which was read to the assemblage by Senator Tower since the Vice President had to cancel his appearance because of the Andropov funeral—to Minister for Defense Woerner's, the message to the Russians was clear. They were called on to show readiness for a dialogue on all East-West issues and return to the Geneva negotiating tables with the aim of reaching agreement on limiting nuclear weapons.

But it was not only Ronald Reagan who shifted his position in the direction of reviving attempts at detente. There also was a shift of the European allies in the direction of the American formula calling for a return to traditional military strength—a field neglected for many years—before a meaningful dialogue with the other side could begin. The only exception was Social Democrat Horst Ehmke, who accused the Americans of playing power

politics games with the allies and of once again trying to attain military superiority. But this critique of his ran into stiff resistance.

There was no inclination at the conference to criticize Reagan's policies; nor were there any questions raised in connection with the huge increases in the American defense budget. On this subject, there were some worried questions being asked outside the conference room in private conversation—particularly among the American participants. German spokesmen, such as Minister of State Mertes, contributed to the overall Western consensus by pointing out that though they were not in favor of spreading ghoulish versions of the Soviet threat they did feel it was necessary to counteract the FRG trend to minimize that threat by calling attention to its real dimensions once again.

At the outset, no one in Munich was in a position to say whether and when the Russians would return to Geneva. American negotiator Nitze drew the conclusion from his "walk-in-the-woods" experience with his Soviet counterpart Kvitsinsky that even a balanced solution for both sides would require a basic Russian decision to relinquish Moscow's claim to a monopoly in medium-range weapons in Europe. One could tell by his facial expression that he doubted that this would happen. The American START negotiator Rowney, on the other hand, was optimistic, saying that the flexible negotiating process thus far seemed encouraging to him.

The future course of the debate on a new strategy for the alliance which the population will understand and support will depend, among other things, on how the East-West relationship develops. Woerner and Ehmke agreed that deterrence doctrine should rely to a lesser extent than heretofore on early use of nuclear weapons. Instead, they are both thinking in terms of strengthening conventional defenses. But it was at this stage that questions began to be raised. But the unavoidably higher costs did not lead to anything like clear conclusions. There needs to be more thought on how the nuclear threshold can be raised without giving up on the concept of preventing military conflict as such—and not only nuclear war.

American and French participants held back during the course of the debate. This was easy for the Americans; they have been saying for years that the Europeans—led by the Germans—should make a greater conventional contribution. The French, for their part, concentrated on greater efforts to work out an independent West European security policy without, however, uncoupling it from the American leadership. Socialist Huntzinger, President Mitterrand's strategic adviser, was in surprising agreement with Baumel, the former Gaullist secretary-general, when he spoke out in favor of Franco-German cooperation which went beyond military affairs alone. This had never been said as plainly at any of the previous Munich conferences.



Thus, there were two priorities that emerged—that defense should take on a more conventional character and that it should be more distinctly European. Both of these concepts are just beginning to be thought through. But there is still lots of room for conflict in the strategy debate—because when it is all said and done it focuses on the fundamental political issues involved in the East-West relationship and on an increase or reduction in security. The Munich conference presented but an initial foretaste of all that.

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## COOL U.S. RESPONSE TO VOGEL VISIT ANALYZED

Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 10 Feb 84 p 3

[Article by Martin E Sueskind: "Assaulting a Wall of Distrust"]

[Excerpt] Washington, 9 February—"Let me ask you a hypothetical question," Rowland Evans said. "Suppose you became chancellor tomorrow, how would you deal with the missile question?" "That is a very theoretical question," Hans-Jochen Vogel said. Evans replied that he was aware of that. "But that is the type of thing the Americans are interested in."

Hans-Jochen Vogel, the leader of the West German opposition has come here to answer questions on where the SPD stands no matter who puts these questions to him for whatever reason. And so he deals with the one just mentioned, too. As German chancellor he would surely be unable simply to ignore the decision to deploy the new Pershing II missiles in Germany which was contained in the two-track resolution. But it was equally certain that he would not accept this decision lying down. The American President could not simply brush aside the expression of the political will of a German government to delay deployment and enter into new disarmament negotiations with the Soviet Union, Vogel said.

As we remarked earlier, the question is not topical in the least and yet all the discussions the chairman of the SPD Bundestag fraction had in the course of his 3-day visit to the American capital focused on it just the same. There is no glory in any of this; in fact, it comes down to the strenuous experience of frustration. A year earlier, when Vogel appeared here in his role of candidate for the chancellorship and was able for a time to bask in the aura of a potential winner, things still looked different. Now that the battles for the chancellorship and the missiles have both been fought and lost, things look grey for the opposition leader here in Washington. It will take a lot of time, patience and convincing arguments to bring down the wall of distrust which stands in the SPD's way here.

It makes little difference whether the person he is talking to is a Republican or a Democrat; whether he is a member of the right wing of the Reagan administration or whether he belongs to the comparatively enlightened center. Anyone who deals with the issue at all puts more or less the same question to Vogel. The most poignant version of all is asked by Ted van Dyck, the head of a research institute with close ties to the Democratic

Party. He patiently listens to what Vogel has to say on the SPD position on NATO and the missiles at a dinner for some 35 guests organized by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. But then he gets up and makes his point which is: why, for God's sake, people did not stop talking about "these Per-shings?" "Helmut Schmidt wanted them," van Dyck says, "and that is all there is to it." Vogel has a strained expression as he now gets up to reply. But he does not want to let pass without comment what he considers to be an inaccurate description of these events which has signally contributed to the confusion. "Let me therefore explain once more..." he starts and then proceeds for at least the fifth time on that day to explain the complex set of circumstances which, as he sees it, have caused the SPD to adopt a different point of view on the missile issue from the one the former chancellor held when he was in office.

All of this is hard to understand for his American listeners—the more so since Vogel, who is speaking in English, will not be deterred from presenting his arguments systematically and at some length. On this issue, one single viewpoint has taken firm hold clear across the political spectrum. Karsten Voigt and Dietrich Stobbe, the two Bundestag deputies who are accompanying Vogel, have had the same experience. Voigt, who already spent a week in Washington and New York talking to both government officials, opinion experts and media personalities, feels it will take a long time for his party to regain an unencumbered basis for understanding in Washington. "We must take a realistic view of the situation and not delude ourselves," he says. "We must accept the fact that this will be a long-term job for us."

The arms modernization debate in the FRG and the closeness of the SPD to the peace movement in particular have led to judgments both inside and outside the American government and even to some second thoughts concerning the Germans who do not make a distinction between America and Russia; with regard to a growing SPD trend toward neutralism and with regard to nationalistic tendencies which make it appear prudent to cast a watchful eye on the FRG. Is it really inaccurate to say that West German politicians have been talking about reunification with increasing frequency of late? And what about these weird attempts at delving into the special common interests of the two German states?

#### Watchful Interest

Questions such as these are also being asked at higher levels in the State Department. They have become a part of the political assessment of the situation and are not even restricted to the SPD itself any longer. It is by no means a coincidence that at the very time that Vogel is hurrying from one appointment to the next the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, which has close ties to the CDU, is hosting an event on the "German question." Minister [for Inner-German Affairs] Windelen and CDU/CSU politicians Marx and Heck are there and what they say is listened to with watchful interest nurtured by distrust. The feeling is that there is a new trend in the making and that one is on to it.

The American SPD image is not entirely home-grown; CDU-inspired publications have played a role, too. There is a book on the Greens, for example, on which Werner Kaltefleiter collaborated and in which the Washington for Foreign Policy Analysis which works closely with the Adenauer Foundation makes the simple, flat statement that the SPD has turned left in order to capture the Green vote, thereby losing its capacity to govern. It will not regain that capacity until it ends its attempts at integrating the left and has found its way back to the political center.

Inside the government, such views have taken root. Vogel, too, encounters these views even if those he sees are polite enough not to say so. Plain talk is reserved for the press. John Kornblum, head of the German Desk at the State Department, unhesitatingly comes out with what others are thinking. There is a common basis with the present Bonn government parties, he says; there is none with the opposition.

Vogel's "message" that the time has come for new American initiatives and for a concrete proposal to resume the Geneva disarmament talks is duly noted. There are many who listen to him. Aside from Vice President Bush and Secretary Shultz, they are not members of the top echelon but they do wield influence nonetheless—men such as Ken Adelman, the head of the disarmament agency; assistant Secretary of State Richard Perle or National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane. Vogel informs the journalists that he did not try to see the President. But that would not have helped much either, he says. The answers he has been getting in response to his proposals even at the middle echelons have been quite undiplomatically straightforward. There was absolutely no intention to make proposals to the Soviet Union—coupled with concessions no doubt—Adelman said, arguing that it would be inadmissible to reward the Soviets for having walked out of the medium-range missile negotiations.

The people Vogel talked to left no doubt about the fact that the Reagan administration has no serious plans for combining the various negotiations in Geneva. Though people are polite, matter-of-fact and friendly in their rejection of Vogel's positions, that does not alter the content of the conversations or their outcome.

It was Dietrich Stobbe who finally came out and said what Vogel's concerns are. Now that the medium-range missile buildup is continuing and a new round in the arms race may be beginning as a result of the deployment of new Soviet missile systems in the GDR, one has to ask oneself in all honesty what has really been achieved during the 7 years that have elapsed since Helmut Schmidt's discovery of the European "missile gap." Back then in 1977, the former chancellor called on the United States to include the growing nuclear disparity in Europe in the negotiations and that was the stone that started it all rolling. The outcome was not disarmament but an arms buildup. In thinking back, Stobbe asks the worried question: "Are we back where we started in 1977?"

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## STOBBE URGES COMMON EUROPEAN SECURITY POLICY

Bonn VORWAERTS in German 2 Feb 84 pp 15-16

[Article by Dietrich Stobbe, SPD Bundestag deputy: "Detente Via Greater European Independence"]

[Text] There were some in the United States who registered shock about the fact that the "national dream" of the Germans was suddenly developing a new thrust which this time was coming from the left end of the spectrum, searching for a new German "identity" in Europe. This quest for identity manifests itself in both German states in scattered, isolated ways that have, however, been noted by many—inside the Protestant Church, among a great many artists and intellectuals, in a variety of peace groups and inside the SPD. And there are some in the new government who are thinking along the lines of a German-German "community of responsibility."

This line of thinking does not place the emphasis on a desire for reunification but on a "two-state patriotism" which in view of our situation is understandable and not terribly surprising and which hopes for a new freedom of action occasioned by distancing ourselves from the powers under whose lead we presently operate. However: the kind of detente which is being proclaimed here as an independent German venture, as it were, cannot be envisaged in the long term independent of the superpowers which are acting in a confrontational style toward each other.

Nor should we Germans ever forget that even the slightest intimation of re-nascent German national consciousness is viewed with the utmost displeasure abroad. After all, East-West relations ever since 1945 have been focused on exercising control over the center of Europe. For that reason, the most important and decisive postwar experience we have had is that there can be no isolated German solutions. Significantly, the only real progress on the German question was achieved within the context of superpower cooperation and ever since its demise, things have merely been limping along. A "German-German entente" as a kind of secret German alliance does not have a chance. Progress on the German question can only be achieved, if both German states retain or acquire the capability to exert successful pressure on their respective hegemonial powers with a view toward bringing about international cooperation. This cannot be done by dropping out of the respective alliances but by staying in.



This two-state patriotism did not become as intense until after detente began to be put in question. In today's transatlantic debate, there is a need to make it clear to the Americans that the new quest for German identity is closely tied to the hegemonial confrontation policy of the Reagan administration; indeed that it is in many ways a direct outgrowth of it. We must also tell them that this trend toward German-German ways of thinking "without recourse to the hegemonial powers" will increase to the extent that the United States contribute to casting doubt on detente instrumentalities which have organically grown up in Europe.

#### Hoping for Change in America

We might say similar things about the Europeanization of Europe. Yes, there is a Europe of the fatherlands on both sides of the political dividing line and the desire is there to live together amidst an ongoing exchange—even in the face of an increasing confrontation between the world powers. But that dream of an autonomous European detente, does it not overlook that most elementary European fact of life which is that both world powers are poised along the Elbe, armed to the teeth, and are, for all that, defending our very own interests ? And as for the "Europeanization of Europe," is it not an unhistorical concept in the sense of negating the consequences of World War II and assigning to small a value to the interests of the world powers in Europe ?

The fact is that any detente in Europe "without recourse to the world powers" because they are far too occupied with their rivalries in other parts of the world fails to take into account that the United States and the Soviet Union perhaps even more needed to commit themselves militarily, economically and politically in Europe—as they still do—in order to help provide the underpinnings for their world power status. Thus, in this context too, new ground for the "Europeanization of Europe" can only be gained, if the Europeans—inside their pact systems—succeed in convincing their respective hegemonial powers of the advantages of renewed cooperation between the world powers.

In the context of the Western debate this means that a united Western Europe must to all intents and purposes fight to convince the United States of the need to return to superpower cooperation unless such a readiness develops as a result of renewed policy changes on the domestic level. Many hopes in Europe today are focused on just such a train of events.

Hopes for a united Europe should be accompanied by the sober realization that we have thus far not succeeded in agreeing on a common European foreign policy which would constitute a kind of West European opposition camp within the alliance in spite of the fact that world power cooperation has crumbled and in spite of the obvious dangers facing the divided continent as a result of this development. But the fact that we are aware of the national egocentricities of the West European members of the alliance must not keep us from starting on the long overdue debate dealing with the basic concept of laying our common West European interests on the table which is contained in the opposition camp formula.

Agreement on common foreign policy goals among the European members of the alliance must take precedence over decisions on alternative military strategies. The primacy of policy must once again come to the fore; otherwise, debates on new military strategies will be without any foundation.

The present trend shows that there also are differences in the political interests of Western Europe and the United States.

Although we both continue to be interested in keeping the Soviet Union from attaining world hegemony, Western Europe is not interested in the dangerous attempt by the United States to regain its world hegemony position. Instead, the West European nations must pin their hopes on a global peaceful order based on equality and balance between the two superpowers. This common view represents a major source of West European arguments in any discussion with the United States.

While the United States is inclined to sacrifice the instrumentalities of detente to superpower competition, the Europeans must jointly try to maintain and expand upon the bridges for mutual understanding which have already been built. This common approach, too, represents a great strength which enables Europe to hold its own within the alliance.

Organically grown East-West structures in trade and commerce could serve to make the two world-political camps more dependent on each other, thereby supporting the maintenance of peace. The pipeline deal was a striking example of West European unity in its dealings with the United States.

Clearly, the West European members of the alliance entertain a different view of the Soviet Union from that of the present American administration. In West European eyes, the Soviet Union has become a status quo power intent on holding on to its possessions in Europe on which, after all, its very existence as a world power depends. As a result of the secret and unannounced realization of its own ideological and economic shortcomings, the Soviet Union has no interest in further expansion in Europe. The view of the Soviet Union as a status quo power in Europe lends strength to the West Europeans in their debate with the Americans because they are able to point to their own actual experiences with a functioning system based on common interest.

#### Restoring the Primacy of Policy

These points demonstrate that the European members of the alliance must undertake a new initiative in order to get the Americans to engage in a new cooperation between the superpowers. Our present conformism does not do justice to the need to bring this conflict out into the open. We now have the foreign minister of the FRG calling on Americans and Europeans to close ranks and saying that it is imperative that "the military coupling be transformed into a firm political coupling." That means we have come down quite a ways in the alliance because the primacy of policy has been discarded and military strategy seems to be defining political strategy.



A more self-assured Europe can and must propound better arguments in order to gain stronger influence on the redefinition of the political strategy of the alliance. The West Europeans ought to be prepared to go beyond their own immediate interests in order to exercise a positive influence on world affairs. They also have an opportunity to build on their relatively broad common base in Third World policies. This would not only be in the interest of the Third World but could have a positive, though indirect effect on the East-West relationship as well.

With the help of this new resoluteness on these issues, the West Europeans could make it clear to the Americans that hunger and want and not Moscow are primarily responsible for the many conflicts and the unrest in the southern hemisphere. A European policy vis-a-vis the developing countries which rejects ideological explanations for these problems and does not shy away from dispute with Washington on this issue might help reduce the erroneous perception of the Soviet Union prevalent in the United States which presently has such a major impact on the foreign policy of the Reagan administration. The West German government must not be surprised, if a sensitized public will emphatically criticize its falling into line with the Reagan policies—as evidenced in this area, too (such as in the case of southern Africa and Central America—and will offer political resistance to this approach.

But European independence in Third World policies does not by any means rule out agreement with the United States in the assessment of specific areas of conflict. If there were European-American agreement in the assessment of some crisis outside Europe, the West Europeans should not let the Americans bear the costs and risks of settling such a conflict alone but instead make a contribution of their own, if a genuine contribution to peace is involved. The decisive factor would have to be that the commitment to such a joint European-American undertaking was followed by a commitment on the part of the United States not to use West Europe as an instrument to apply pressure in the East-West conflict—in other words to build the European detente area up as a new front.

The idea is not to take risks with the European detente formula but to promote it actively as a model for the peaceful resolution of conflicts and, if possible, even to export it in case such an extra-European crisis did arise.

#### Detente Through Changes in the Alliance

If we wish to maintain detente in Europe, then we must win this privilege by attaining greater independence inside the alliance. This will not be achieved by adhering to more and more limited regional patterns of political thinking, nor by retreating into our shell for the sake of harmony—which is to succumb to a dangerous delusion. Instead, there is an urgent need for us to expand our thinking and to become aware of our extra-European

interests. Thereby we can become a factor in the alliance which successfully presents its own interests in helping to develop the grand strategy further.

If we do not want to see Europe turn into a hot zone in world politics once again, then the continuation of detente can only be achieved through changes in the alliance—with the West Europeans not withdrawing from their role in international affairs but taking an active part in them. At the Stockholm conference on confidence-building measures and disarmament in Europe, the West European nations have a great opportunity jointly to develop and submit their positions. For all that, this conference could serve to rebuild the interrupted communication links between East and West with the help of some skillful diplomacy—although it is doubtful whether this can quickly be achieved after so many years of disruption in East-West relations.

The grand security partnership idea would be worthless, however, if Western Europe is unable to make a successful effort to create an international situation in which cooperation between the big powers in the interest of world peace once more assumed central importance.

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## SPD LEADERSHIP SEEKS SECURITY POLICY CONSENSUS

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 10 Feb 84 p 6

[Article by Kurt Becker: "Many Philosophies—One Goal ?"]

[Text] One of the most enduring as well as damaging consequences of the SPD assault on Western arms modernization is that the party now faces widespread doubt both in its reliability in foreign and security policy matters and in its future course. But it is some of the allies who have been most profoundly frightened by the vehemence of the emotions discharged in the course of the arms modernization debate. In France, above all, the peace movement and the SPD were unjustifiably and totally equated; the result being that the restless Germans—in the eyes of the French—are more and more succumbing to pacifist and neutralist sentiments and are in the process of turning their backs on the West over the long term.

But even most of the high-level SPD foreign and security policy specialists were greatly astounded about how the negative sentiments toward arms modernization, carried along by a wave of mass support, swept all else aside. This included not only the warning voice of former chancellor Helmut Schmidt but also the policy experts who were left with no chance at all to make their influence felt in the face of the vote which had the blessing of the SPD chairman Willy Brandt.

But of late, a much needed and unavoidable reaction has set in. On the one hand, there is an attempt on the part of the leadership at keeping the arms modernization protest from assuming a life of its own and becoming a dominant foreign policy issue. On the other hand, there is a plan to set up new markers in foreign and security policy to regain the trust that was lost when the party withdrew its support from the two-track decision.

The old Wehner axiom still holds that the SPD is not the party of revolution but of resolution. Accordingly, the draft for a new alliance strategy heads the list of proposals to be discussed at the party congress in May. The draft includes political affirmations which in years past would have been termed banal but which today assume special importance in view of the very diversified trends that ultimately led to the condemnation of the arms modernization precepts. The very first paragraph of the draft contains the following imperative: "The FRG remains tied both politically and militarily to the EEC and to NATO. It enjoys its security only in conjunction with its partners and allies—and not without them."

Among the other points which are made there is one stating that the SPD—for all the impassioned debate about NATO defense strategy within its ranks—considers that strategy binding unless and until a new one is adopted. This leads over into the thesis that any new military strategy must impose an intolerably high risk on the adversary in case he decides to mount an attack. The thesis is based on a number of criteria derived from the overall concept of military defense solely by conventional means; of raising the nuclear threshold under any circumstances; of doing away with the resort to battlefield nuclear weapons and of withdrawing these weapons altogether. Nuclear weapons, the draft proposes, should be limited to strategic deterrence—and if possible on sea-based deterrents. The ultimate goal is a nuclear-free Europe.

The long-range political goal of a security partnership between East and West—a concept developed by Egon Bahr and violently opposed by the government—recurs again and again in the document. It is proposed as a means to counter the existing mechanics of the arms race; to work out a military strategy which avoids political confrontations and to establish adequate and strict defensive standards on weaponry. This is tied to a list of proposals for arms control negotiations—along the lines of the recommendations made by the Palme Commission—which include a renunciation of force agreement by East and West, a chemical weapon-free zone and a nuclear-free zone on both sides of the European divide 150 kilometers wide.

On some of the proposals the distance between the opposition's point of view and that of the government is but slight. The government, too, has come out in favor of raising the nuclear threshold as has NATO commanding general Rogers. There were, in fact, similar considerations behind NATO's decision last fall to remove 1,400 more tactical nuclear weapons from West European soil without asking the East to reciprocate.

The SPD proposal to concentrate on conventional defense contains some important ideas for a future strategy debate in Bonn—also with regard to the issue of funding although the SPD is not as yet tackling the point. Still, arms control and revisions in military strategy cannot be uncoupled from overall foreign policy considerations which are compatible with our ties to the alliance. The SPD draft makes no mention of this and in this sense, it really does, as Egon Bahr has said, cover the entire social democratic spectrum all the way from Hans Apel to Oskar Lafontaine.

It is only the most recent studies published by Andreas von Buelow, Horst Ehmke and Dieter Haack which give an indication of the ideas which may be expected to play a role in the upcoming party debate. Haack, who adheres to the Schmidt line, was the spokesman of the 25 Bundestag deputies who abstained when the missile vote was taken. His is an urgent plea for a calculable foreign and alliance policy in opposition to any sort of anti-Americanism and to any German attempt at impartially equating the two world powers. As far as Haack is concerned, the faddish slogan of Europeanizing Europe is an illusion. His aim is to achieve a domestic consensus on security policy.

It would seem that Haack is thinking of those groups on the left wing in particular to whom Ehmke, in his paper, submits a qualified tribute as a means of getting them to agree to his proposals for obtaining a new consensus. He tries to do this by not going into any analysis of the Soviet threat whatever and at the same time by mounting a broad-based, sharp attack on the Reagan administration. "Europe must take on more of a responsibility for the defense of the European central front," is one of the key statements made by Ehmke.

By implication this also means that Europe must acquire greater political independence—particularly from the world power United States. In other contexts, however, Ehmke repeatedly points to the indispensable long-range part played by the Americans in our security and is hard put to come up with new ideas for a stronger Europe. The palpably tactical purpose of the Ehmke document makes it abundantly clear how diffuse SPD philosophy presently is—which is a fact of life that Ehmke tries to deal with in some detail. The Buelow document probably is the most noteworthy in that it offers an albeit one-sided but rigorous or even radical review of the ways of conventionalizing military strategy all the way to the establishment of a militia system. He is unlikely to win many friends for it, however.

At any rate, these preliminaries to the SPD debate hold the promise of a discussion on basics. The debate will deal initially with foreign policy goals but will also try to smooth over some of the more missionary excesses of the missile debate. Furthermore, the integration and cohesion of the party will be at stake—as well as its public success. This process will take years; its outcome is entirely uncertain today.

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## RETURN PREMIUM MEETS MIXED FOREIGNER RESPONSE

## Berlin Foreigner Total Declines

Berlin DER TAGESSPIEGEL in German 24 Jan 84 p 12

[Article by "Tsp": "Number of Foreigners in Berlin Generally Declining in 1983." Unemployment often the Reason for Returning Home]

[Text] According to data issued by the Federal Office of Statistics, the number of foreigners living in Berlin, especially Turks, is on the decline. While at the end of 1982 a total of 248,121 foreigners were registered, there were only 244,983 at the end of 1983. The number of Turks living in the city dropped from 119,820 to 117,370. The number of Turkish residents fell below the level at the end of 1981 (118,347). As a comparison: in 1971, a total of 138,559 lived in the city, 54,421 of them Turks.

Barbara John, Senate commissioner in charge of foreigners, stated in an interview yesterday that there are several reasons for the exodus of foreign residents. From intensive counseling sessions with families from non-EC countries who are willing to return home, the conclusion can be drawn that the return premium authorized by the Senate since 12 July of last year plays a not insignificant role in the matter. This financial assistance of DM 5,000 per family makes the decision easier, especially for those who basically intended all along to return home at some point.

The return premium serves "the function of a final trigger," especially for Turkish workers between the ages of 40 and 50 who belong to the first generation of foreign workers. Generally, these returnees wanted to "buy into" Turkish social security with their social security claims acquired in Germany. As a general rule, a Turkish worker already is entitled to social security at the age of 45.

Of the first generation of foreign workers, some of the Turks willing to go home no longer look for continued work as a dependent employee. Instead, they want to secure for themselves a modest income (but above the Turkish average) through investment and rentals, utilizing their savings and capitalizing their earned entitlements. Severance pay after voluntary notice to terminate, or after dismissals, often improves the chances for such an undertaking.

However, it would be totally erroneous to assume that the return premium alone is a motivation for repatriation, the delegate in charge of foreigners stressed. The economic and social situation of foreigners plays an important part in such a decision. Of 151 persons whose applications last year were approved, 125 had been unemployed for some time. High unemployment and the rising cost of living contribute to the decision to return to the homeland. Frau John stated that, in general, it is much cheaper in Turkey than in Germany to manage a living in case of unemployment.

She called unfounded the often-heard claim that foreigners burdened the social [safety] net. A review of the income of Turkish families who had applied for repatriation had shown that although many applicants were entitled to social assistance, they had not used it.

Frau John emphasized that a financial repatriation assistance was in no way "a political panacea" for solving the problem of foreign workers. Not all foreigners could return to their homeland, especially not those born and reared here. For this reason, political efforts must stress integration, which Berlin has been trying for years. A look at the figures shows this: in 1983, approximately DM 100 million were spent on integration measures in the educational and training sectors of the city, but only DM 700,000 on return premiums. Similar ratios are also true for other states in the FRG.

#### Duesseldorf Reports Few Takers

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 2 Feb 84 p 4

[Article by Reinhard Voss, datelined Duesseldorf: "One Can Simply Forget About the Return Premiums from Bonn. Farthmann presents a study on foreign women in North Rhine-Westphalia / Churches and independent organizations are to promote integration / Empty coffers.]

[Text] The federal government's financial assistance for Turks who have lost their jobs in the FRG and are willing to return to their homeland will not lower noticeably the high number of foreigners in the Rhine and Ruhr areas. Labor Minister Friedrich Farthmann (SPD) of North Rhine-Westphalia reported on Wednesday in Duesseldorf that, of 30,000 Turks who are entitled to such return premiums, only 3,200 had filed appropriate applications. In view of at least 1.4 million foreigners residing in North Rhine-Westphalia, one could "simply forget about" this program of the federal government, Farthmann stated.

Presenting a study by the University of Cologne's Institute of Social Psychology on the life of foreign women in North Rhine-Westphalia, Farthmann said that it is all the more important to strengthen efforts aiming at the integration of foreigners, especially Turks and their wives and daughters. The study regrets the total isolation to which many Turkish women and girls are subjected in the FRG. Only one in four Turkish women works outside the home. Among all other nationalities, about twice as many women are employed.



The authors of the Cologne study consider these differences a clear indication of the traditional role pattern for Turkish wives who are preferably kept at home by their husbands. According to studies by the Cologne social psychologists, the women's resignation and isolation grows stronger when their children, in contrast to themselves, learn to speak German relatively quickly and therefore approach their mothers "with superiority and arrogance," as the study puts it.

Because of empty coffers, and doubts about the efficacy of state-run integration programs, the North Rhine-Westphalian government is not in a position to improve the situation of foreign women through any publicly financed promotion programs. Farthmann appealed to the churches and other independent organizations to improve and strengthen opportunities for foreign women.

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## PERSHING DECISION'S EFFECT ON DEFENSE POLICY, FRANCO-GERMAN TIES

Paris POLITIQUE ETRANGERE in French 4th Quarter 83 pp 859-878

[Article by Pierre Lellouche, assistant director, French Institute for International Relations: "France in the 'Post-Pershing' Era"; words enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] In spite of appearances, and many commentaries stating so, the euromissile controversy did not end when the first 9 Pershing-II and the first 32 cruise missiles were set up on European soil in December 1983. Their deployment marked the beginning of a period which may well turn out to be infinitely more complex than the already quite eventful four-year period between the "dual" decision of 12 December 1979 and the arrival of the first missiles in Europe late in 1983. Another paradox is that this second round could pose problems to France that would be far more acute than in the past and probably even more strongly felt than those which the other western powers will have to face, thus creating a situation that would be the exact opposite of the situation prevailing before the initial euromissile deployment. The "post-Pershing" era could indeed impose upon France the difficult task of redefining in depth the very bases of its defense and security policy, in a new political and strategic context. Such a redefinition might in turn cause a rupture of the apparent consensus which has characterized the French defense debate until now.

But let us start at the beginning. What are the main characteristics of this second round in the euromissile controversy?

### The "Post-Pershing" Era

The phrase "post-Pershing era," which was first used in the press--and which we use here intentionally--reflects quite well the complexity and ambivalence of the present time.

To a certain extent, we are indeed already in the post-Pershing era, considering the particular importance assumed by the /initial deployment/ of a number, even a modest number, of Pershing and Cruise missiles. Indeed, we should remember that the whole political dynamics of the debate, both in the West and on the Soviet side, focussed on the key-deadline of December 1983. In the West, the "dual" decision of 1979 was in fact seen as a sort of countdown ending--or not, depending on the outcome of the Geneva negotiations--with the actual missile deployment starting in 1983. In this context, the first deployment assumed of

necessity the importance of a fundamental test since that single fact was to control the rest of the whole process while putting at stake the political credibility of the governments which had signed the decision. We should also note that, during four years, the USSR saw fit to focus its whole diplomatic and propaganda effort on that very initial-deployment "test," thus giving it an absolutely essential symbolic and political meaning (that was at any rate quite exaggerated considering the military significance of the numbers involved).

By basing all its argumentation, all its propaganda on the rejection of even /a single/ U.S. missile, the USSR obviously hoped to achieve several essential objectives:

- first, the consecration of its position of monopoly--with respect to the United States--in the field of medium-range ground-to-ground nuclear missiles in Europe, and therefore at the same time:
- the consecration of the uncoupling of the U.S. and West European territories (the Soviet views on "parity" and "equal security" entitling Moscow to equality in several distinct "balances," first with respect to intercontinental strategic weapons with the United States, but also regionally, in Europe and Asia, i.e. entitling it to superiority over any single one of its opponents);
- finally, should the NATO decision be rescinded (or deferred) under the pressure of European governments, the demonstration that the USSR now possesses greater political influence over Western Europe than the United States, and at least the right to veto the security policy of its European neighbors.

For all these reasons, Soviet officials in Geneva could not accept any compromise that would allow the slightest U.S. deployment<sup>1</sup>--and they also said so repeatedly. Actually, such a decision would have amounted to a /ratification/ of the right of the United States to deploy medium-range systems in Europe, i.e. it would have put a brutal stop to the historical (and, according to the Soviets, ineluctable) transformation of the European security system inherited from Yalta into a new "collective security system" (the "military detente") dominated by the USSR and from which the United States would progressively be excluded. The Soviets felt they were in a position to impose such a system based on the "correlation of forces" achieved since Yalta, viz. strategic parity /plus/ conventional and nuclear superiority in Europe; in this context, therefore, the repeal of the NATO decision assumed crucial importance.

In setting themselves such goals, however--and especially in making them almost solely dependent on the initial deployment test--the Soviets were running a risk at least as great as what they hoped to win. For, after the initial deployment--which has now taken place--the USSR is now, in spite of itself, in an execrable position: in a way, it is giving to the West the very reverse proof of what it wanted to do to it. It lost the test of will and the United States and NATO now show that their influence in Europe is still far greater than that of the USSR: thanks to Moscow--this is not the smallest irony--Europe now appears to be much less "finlandized" than had been assumed by a certain American right... and probably also much stronger than it actually is.

In the second place, the strategic stakes of the initial deployment--namely the much talked about "recoupling"--which the Soviets opposed so strongly was also achieved... even though the last word may not yet have been said in this respect, as we shall see later.

In brief, the Soviets got themselves "stuck" in a position in which all they can do is "retaliate" although that may be counterproductive, as in the case of the START suspension, and will become untenable in the long run. As for military retaliation (especially the installation of the SS-21, 22 and 23 missiles in East Europe), it was expected (and unavoidable) anyhow, and at any rate it is far from amounting to the "risks of war" which Soviet propaganda--relayed by European pacifists--kept hinting at, should the Europeans "dare" deploy.

In other words, instead of playing the first round of the euromissile battle like a chess game--as they had the opportunity to do--the Soviets yielded to the temptation of accelerating the game by making the initial deployment the stakes of a bluff worthy of a planetary poker game. The bluff backfired because the Kremlin failed to offer in time real concessions (SS-20 reduction) in exchange for non-deployment. The situation is now reversed, and the West is "calling the bluff." But the USSR now appears to have already played most of its master cards.

Does this mean, however, that the game is over and that, as is being said here and there, the Pershing controversy is "behind us"? I do not believe so. And it is precisely in this respect that the phrase "post-Pershing era" appears to me to be both premature and even mistaken to a certain extent. This, for two series of reasons, some having to do with the "mechanics" of the 1979 decision, others with the fact that the initial deployment actually does not solve any of the essential problems which the Alliance had to face in recent years.

Let us first look at the 1979 decision which, we should point out, still represents the line of conduct of the Atlantic Alliance, even after the initial deployment. This decision is important for the future, in two respects: first, because it provides for a total of 572 missiles to be deployed until 1987-1988--so that the Soviet Union has four more years to put pressure on European public opinion. Now, in this respect, it would be dangerous to underestimate the profound marks that the past four years have left in Europe. Certainly, the Alliance achieved considerable psychological success when it installed the first Pershings as scheduled. But at what price! The price for these nine Pershings was the rupture of the FRG political consensus on security! What will the price be for the next 99 missiles? And what will the political situation elsewhere in Europe be when the next shipments arrive? Will European democracies retain enough energy to "take" four more years of internal controversies?

At this point, the question must be seen in the light of another fundamental aspect of the 1979 decision: the connection between deployment and negotiation. I have analyzed elsewhere the extremely dangerous consequences of such an approach in the implementation of the defense policies of Western democracies.<sup>2</sup> We also know what nefarious consequences that same connection may have had in the European political debate, in the period prior to the initial deployment. In particular, we saw the SPD [Social-Democratic Party of Germany] explain its refusal to vote for deployment in the FRG (although its own leaders had welcomed

it four years before) by claiming that the Geneva negotiations were not carried out with enough "good faith" (especially on the part of the United States) to justify the deployment of the missiles. We can easily imagine what will come next, during the round which has just started and which has seen the Soviet Union break the INF and suspend the START and MBFR negotiations. Until now,<sup>3</sup> Western governments have managed to use the Soviets' departure from Geneva by taking advantage of the surprise effect caused among the pacifists by the arrival of the first missiles. But this respite cannot realistically be hoped to last beyond the next few months. Indeed, politically, the rest of the deployment remains tied to the resumption of negotiations, but prospects for such a resumption are practically nil for the time being.

For the reasons we mentioned before, the Soviet Union will not return to the INF forum, as it was organized until now--unless the Kremlin should completely reverse its position and suddenly declare itself ready to recognize in an agreement the deployment of U.S. euromissiles in Europe, which seems extremely unlikely. Conversely, the U.S. government (at least if we are to believe recent indications<sup>4</sup>) appears to be heading with increased determination toward a clearcut refusal to merge the START and INF negotiations, although this may be the only solution to get out of the deadlock.

However, neither Moscow nor Washington can be satisfied with an indefinite prolongation of the deadlock either. The USSR cannot afford to maintain for long its attitude of boycotting arms control negotiations, as it could backfire and ease the task of U.S. diplomacy in Europe, i.e. bring about the deployment of new euromissiles. In addition, it is in the Kremlin's best interest to continue strategic arms negotiations, if only to try and "put a ceiling" on certain U.S. arms programs.

For the Reagan administration, a prolonged deadlock would also be a disaster. First, with regard to its allies for, as we just said, deployment cannot continue for long unless something is done about the negotiations. But also for reasons of domestic policy: to be reelected, Ronald Reagan needs the resumption of East-West negotiations or, better still, a compromise.

As we can see, the game is extremely complex: for the moment, the Soviets have no reason whatsoever to give President Reagan an election "gift" as long as the latter does not make appreciable concessions, both in the START negotiations and concerning the rest of the euromissile deployment. All the more so as they are well aware that nothing serious can be signed before the U.S. elections, i.e. before 1985.

Therefore, all this boils down to a dual question: which of the two great powers will give in first, and what will happen on the European political "front" if nothing happens in Geneva between now and 1985?<sup>5</sup>

It is therefore in this context that we should view the sequence of internal tensions within the Atlantic Alliance. For the initial deployment of the Pershing missiles does not solve any of the fundamental problems which the Alliance has been facing for 10 years or so and which the euromissile controversy has brought to light.



First, from a military point of view, although the initial Pershing deployment is vital in that it restores the "coupling" between the U.S. and European territories, it does so only insofar as U.S. officials want it to, for instance by showing that they are prepared to use the Pershing missiles if need be. But what do we see? Just as the first Pershings arrive in Europe, the whole U.S. diplomatic effort toward the Alliance does not consist in insisting on restoring the credibility of their nuclear guarantee, which is thus about to materialize, but rather in "selling" new "conventional dissuasion" doctrines--the Rogers plan and the Airland Battle doctrine. Better still, nearly every week we see another former high U.S. official follow the famous example given by Robert McNamara and his associates, and bluntly tell the Europeans truths to which they have had to become used recently. Namely that, Pershing or not, the United States will never use nuclear weapons to protect Europe. Worse, that the United States /never/ intended to do so. It is now up to the Europeans to understand that their security can now be guaranteed only by modern traditional weapons, precision-guided munitions and other "Assault Breakers" (/made in the United States,/ or course). Now, considering the increasing reservations expressed on the German side--not just on the French side--about the U.S. theories on traditional battle in Europe, we can safely predict that the problem of restructuring the doctrine of graduated reprisals is far from being solved, although it has been "on the table" for several years.

A similar observation must be made concerning political problems within the Alliance, which were also revealed on the occasion of the euromissile controversy. Whereas it is true that the initial Pershing deployment plunged European peace movements--which had already lost much momentum--in a state of disarray, nevertheless the problem of giving "a feeling of security" to European public opinion remains entire. For those who still had doubts, it is now obvious that public opinion in non-nuclear European states can never be mobilized again around the Pershing missiles--or, for that matter, around any other U.S. nuclear weapon. Indeed, the problem of the role of nuclear weapons in Europe has changed its nature: contrary to what was the case when the first peace movements emerged five or six years ago, it is no longer a mere antinuclear fever that would fall sooner or later, especially if European public opinion could be "shocked" into realizing that deployment of the Pershing missiles did not have to be the end of the world. The problem is now assuming a far more formidable dimension, as it was taken up again by large political parties (from the Labor Party to the SPD) and now represents a political challenge to the European security system as a whole.

The phenomenon assumes special importance in the case of the FRG, the keystone of the European system as a whole. Here, the dominant theme in the anti-Pershing dispute is not so much the Pershing missile itself as a weapons system as what it means for the future of Germany. To the French, the Pershing missile is the recoupling weapon, but to some Germans it is primarily the perpetuation of a system in which Germany is a vassal that will continue to be used as a "dumping ground" for weapons ordered elsewhere and by others. In addition to the risk of annihilation imposed by these "others," the Pershing "palisade" is also equated with the freezing of Germany's division, without any hope for a peaceful evolution of the European political order. This has led to the emergence of a national theme in the German debate on "peace": sovereignty as far as weapons control is concerned, special "joint responsibility" of the /two/ Germanies as far as the preservation of peace is concerned, national interest as far as the preservation of the East policy is concerned, Reagan or not, Pershing or not.

Allow me to make this clear: I am not here brandishing the simplistic threat--which unfortunately is all too common in France--that Germany might be willing to trade its neutralization for its reunification. What is involved here is more complex, although potentially as destabilizing for the European system. Briefly, what we are facing is none other than the resurgence of the "German problem" which we thought had been solved once and for all after World War II through partition, and later on by anchoring the Western part of Germany to the West through the dual mechanism of U.S. security under NATO, and the construction of Europe under the EEC. It is significant that the resurgence of the German question should now coincide with the dual crisis of NATO and the EEC. NATO, because U.S. credibility is at stake (the remedy--the Pershing missiles--appearing even worse than the threat--the SS-20) and because--as a German observer who cannot be suspected of leftist leanings told me--the Alliance is no longer perceived, in Germany, as a long term means of changing the political order of Europe. As for the EEC--as was vividly demonstrated by the failure of the recent Athens summit--its mountains of butter and oceans of milk seem to have stifled the famous "European idea" which--in the minds of Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman--was supposed to exorcise the demons of European nationalism and, at any rate, to serve as an outlet for German national aspirations.

In this context, we would have to be naive to the point of insanity to believe that the initial Pershing deployment could solve this problem, even though the Alliance has not progressed one bit in redefining a joint political strategy to face the USSR and especially East Europe. Managing the post-Pershing era will therefore also, and of necessity, require that Western countries manage collectively the German problem as it now presents itself. There is no doubt that this is the most difficult political challenge--as well as the most fundamental--that the United States, France and the other European states will have to face in years to come.

#### Choices for France

This challenge--which we might say amounts to restabilizing Germany and giving it a feeling of security--has also largely inspired Francois Mitterrand's security policy since 1981. France's firm intervention in the euromissile debate, the reactivation of the military provisions of the 1963 Franco-German treaty and the modernization of the French military apparatus, especially through the creation of the Rapid Action Force (FAR), are the three major elements of a policy which is profoundly just in its goals and which has certainly contributed to the success of the West during the first round of the Pershing controversy.

We must now decide whether this policy will be adequate in the post-Pershing era, considering the goals to be achieved, and especially whether the political price to pay--both at home and abroad--will not require an undeniably painful clarification of the fundamental contradictions inherent to the French defense policy since 1958.

From the start, the euromissile controversy placed the French authorities in a veritable dilemma, and they soon realized it could not be solved satisfactorily without paying a high price, in foreign as well as in domestic policy. Actually, the equation included four parameters:

- /the affirmation of their "real" solidarity with Germany/ in the field of security was a must, as the whole French defense policy (including its independent dissuasion force) is based on the stability of Germany, the keystone of the whole European security system, and as Germany's stability was threatened from without by the rupture of the balance of forces in Europe, and from within by the increasingly obvious deviation of the German political consensus on defense;
- yet, such an effective solidarity should not be a threat to the second parameter, viz. /France's absolute independence in carrying out its nuclear dissuasion policy,/ which itself conditioned:
- the preservation of /the domestic political consensus on defense,/ and
- /France's special position both in the Atlantic Alliance (non-integration) and between the two great powers./ One of the manifestations of this specific position was expressed through France's (long-standing) refusal to take part in U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations or to see its forces taken into account in such negotiations.

In practice, France's dilemma amounted to this:

- either France would remain strictly neutral in the euromissile controversy, and this in fact amounted to choosing a military policy of armed neutrality involving the risk of accelerating its non-nuclear neighbors' drift toward neutrality, and possible disarmed neutrality;
- or, on the contrary, France would demonstrate its solidarity with its allies, in the euromissile issue as well as with respect to military cooperation, but in that case it could neither escape Soviet pressures to include its striking force in INF negotiations, nor evade the risk of a domestic political debate on the alleged "atlantist drift" of its defense policy.

Actually, since 1979 France has done both successively--and not without difficulty--first under Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, then under Francois Mitterrand.

When the euromissile controversy started, President Giscard d'Estaing, who was both less concerned than his successor by the internal evolution of Germany and less convinced of what the euromissile controversy would mean for the balance of forces, thought he could privilege the last three parameters. His calculation was simple: France would trade the Soviet goodwill on the question of whether or not the strategic nuclear force should be taken into account for the French government's silence--i.e. neutrality--in the Pershing debate. This offered the dual advantage of maintaining good relations with the USSR (the objective being to prevent at all cost Germany from supplanting France as "the Kremlin's privileged negotiation partner"<sup>6</sup>) and protecting the domestic political consensus on defense (... not to mention the implicit support of the French Communist Party in a pre-election period). However, this offer of neutrality rested on two errors: one factual, the other analytical. The factual error consisted in ignoring that since 1958-1960, the USSR had been steadily trying to eliminate or to limit the French nuclear force or, at any rate, to have it taken into account through arms control negotiations. The latter issue had also been raised by the Soviet already at the start of the SALT negotiations in 1969. The

analytical error was more serious because in that particular case France had never been in a position to choose neutrality, as the Pershing deployment involved the balance of forces in Europe and the stability of the FRG, two essential factors in our overall defense policy. Besides, how could Valéry Giscard d'Estaing hope to convince the Soviets of his "neutrality" and of the strictly "domestic" character of our dissuasion, considering that after signing the Ottawa declaration in 1974, and two years later launching the idea of "enlarged sanctuarization," he had chaired in person the 1979 summit of four in Guadeloupe, during which the famous "dual" decision of December 1979 was arrived at? Not only was such a position untenable, but it could also accelerate our neighbors' "drift" which was already apparent in 1980-1981.

This indeed, and the imperative necessity of restoring the balance of forces, were François Mitterrand's concern when he adopted the decidedly "interventionist" policy that became his in 1981. But there was also a price to pay for such a policy: by insisting publicly that his European neighbors should deploy Pershing missiles, was not the chief of state justifying the Soviet argumentation on the question of whether or not our forces should be taken into account, especially with respect to the public opinion in non-nuclear allied countries? A far more perverse effect was that when he tried to counter the Soviet argumentation by repeatedly stating that "our striking force protects only France," the president of the Republic may have been in contradiction with his whole policy toward Germany. And was he not running the risk of making France look like the "kind giver of advice" who tells the "others" to arm themselves and does not do anything for them, while her refusal to be counted in Geneva represents the greatest obstacle to an "equitable" and rapid negotiated solution?<sup>7</sup>

Unfortunately, these (unavoidable) contradictions were made worse by statements made to justify the 1979 decision and which were often contradictory. In this respect, we must acknowledge that the French government showed the same confusion as its NATO partners. For instance, how could it say that the Pershing missile would "recouple" and maintain that we could do without it if the USSR would accept Ronald Reagan's "zero ground option"? It is one thing to say that France is for restoring the balance of forces; but was it necessary to support publicly the pseudo compromise of the "stroll in the woods," or the negotiation terms contained in the Williamsburg statement, since France did not wish to join the INF negotiations?

These blunders could not fail to be exploited by a curious coalition of opponents: communists and pacifists on the one hand, who wanted the French force to be counted in Geneva; a few Giscard supporters and gaullists on the other side, the former out of hostility to the president's excessive activism, the latter because they feared the Atlantist drift of the new government. The result was essentially a politicians' quarrel on a false issue. Instead of criticizing François Mitterrand's decision to speak up on the euromissiles, in the name of some sacrosanct "independence" (the Pershing issue was "none of our business," they said), they would have done better to question the ends of his policy and decide whether or not France should worry about the stability of the FRG, contribute to its security and through what concrete means. Unfortunately, another false quarrel like that was to start the following year (in 1983) on the creation of the Rapid Action Force.



This initiative could have--at last--given French authorities an opportunity to explain publicly, and outline, the new orientations of our security policy, taking into account the new European political and strategic context of the 1980's. Everything seemed to concur: the personal convictions of the president of the Republic who, in his time, had pointed out the "contradiction" inherent to the French policy as the country was caught between its own dissuasion and its commitment to the Alliance; the fact that political leaders (especially in the Rally for the Republic) were aware that the changes that had occurred in Europe--and especially in the FRG--called for an evolution of the defense policy which had been defined during another era, that of the 1960's.

What happened instead? As far as the government was concerned, the very concept of the Rapid Action Force, and especially the manner in which its creation was progressively explained to the opinion, revealed one major concern: to "do something" for the Germans, but without bringing about a rupture of the French consensus on the two key-words of our defense policy: "independence" and "national dissuasion of the strong by the weak." The trick consisted in organizing the means for an effective and rapid engagement of France on the side of Germany in case of war, while clearly uncoupling them from our nuclear means, including tactical means.

This small masterpiece of political and strategic Cartesianism had something to please everybody, at least on paper:

- to the Germans and to the Alliance, it gave a tangible proof of France's solidarity--at any rate a more tangible one than the units of the First Army which were a little too mobile, deployed a little bit too far and especially too much linked to the French strategic nuclear maneuver;
- to the USSR, it indicated that the strike force remained perfectly independent and "domestic," and that therefore it had nothing to do with the INF negotiations;
- as far as domestic policy was concerned, finally, the creation of the Rapid Action Force had been especially "well done": its "solidarity" facet was designed to please the center and the Atlantist and European right, whereas the dissociation between the Rapid Action Force and the nuclear weapons was designed to reassure the Gaullian traditionalists (in the Rally for the Republic as well as at... the CERES [Center for Socialist Studies, Research and Education]).

Therefore, once again the basic question of the linkage between the French nuclear force and the defense of Europe was disposed of. With a few exceptions, opposition leaders did not even mention that there was a problem: the main criticism directed at the Rapid Action Force was not that, in fact, it retained all the ambivalence of the previous position--and even added to it--but that it amounted to a creeping "reintegration" of France into the integrated NATO system, especially through its logistic support system.

## Prospects

In view of this background, the issue facing France in the "post-Pershing era" is a dual one: will the new orientations defined by the president of the Republic



during the last two years be adequate to meet the foreseeable challenges, or will they have to be complemented by other initiatives? Will the latter be feasible without endangering the delicate domestic political balance on the security policy?

At diplomatic level, the first difficulty that can be expected has to do with the still unresolved issue of whether or not our dissuasion force should be taken into account in U.S.-Soviet negotiations on arms limitation. Unavoidably, the problem will come up again when negotiations are resumed, which, as we know, remains an essential prerequisite to the continued deployment of the euromissiles. In this respect, we may fear that the question of taking the French dissuasion force into account may increase the cleavages that can already be observed between non-nuclear European countries on the one hand and France and Great-Britain on the other hand, as the former see the latter's refusal to agree to a compromise as the major cause of the continued negotiation deadlock.

A foreseeable consequence is that, as the United States are subjected to pressures from non-nuclear countries and, for other reasons (including the elections), would like to get the dialogue with Moscow going again, they might be tempted to offer concessions to Moscow, at the expense of Paris and London. In the long run, therefore, the issue could be further complicated by the creation of an additional source of tension, this time among the three Western nuclear powers. The strong French and British reactions to Vice-President Bush's recent statements on this subject show what a sensitive issue this is. On the French side, it is obvious that if pressures on France were to increase further in the future, and if the United States were perceived as ready to compromise with the Soviets on this point, reactions could be extremely serious and bring about a radical change of orientation of the French security policy, which would reverse the trend to European--and even Atlantic--commitment of recent years.

Now, the whole problem arises from the fact that the issue of whether or not the French dissuasion force should be counted will arise independently of the circumstances under which negotiations are resumed.

The solution the United States appear to prefer--at least for the time being--would be to "go on as before," namely to keep the START and INF negotiations separate. Apart from the fact that the Soviets are not likely to resume the INF negotiations at the point where they left them, the problem of including the French dissuasion force would still not be solved--quite to the contrary. Indeed, we should expect the political pressure from our European (and even U.S.) allies to increase, if only to arrive at a compromise rapidly and avoid years of controversy. In this respect, we should wonder whether the president of the Republic's recent statements in which he appeared to make a distinction between the 18 S-3 missiles of the Albion plateau and the rest of our strategic forces<sup>8</sup> were made as a hint to a possible compromise at the INF negotiations: the 18 S-3 missiles would be included into the "eurostrategic" balance, the others would remain excluded, as a truly "strategic" force.

In that case, however, would there not be a flagrant contradiction in the argumentation France has supported until now: indeed, how could the S-3 missiles be "eurostrategic" when they were designed for exactly the same purpose as our missile-launching nuclear submarines? And would that not constitute a dangerous

precedent when we want to modernize the land component of our strategic nuclear force (S-X program)? Finally, how can we reconcile these statements with the firm and consistent position which the president of the Republic himself explained at the United Nations on 29 September 1983?

The other theory--that of a merger of the INF and START negotiations--is none easier. In that case, the problem of including the French dissuasion force would be raised again by the Soviets, no longer in connection with a regional "eurostrategic balance" (at the INF negotiations) but to ask for a U.S. "compensation" for the forces of their allies. This is also the formula that the United States had implicitly adopted under the interim SALT-I agreement. Today, however, it is excluded that the United States may agree to such a solution. Apart from the legal obstacle which the Jackson amendment represents,<sup>9</sup> we fail to see how Washington could agree to a strategic arms ceiling that, taking into account the current French and British modernization programs, would be some 1,500-2,000 warheads below that of the Soviets. Especially if the total ceiling suggested by the Reagan Administration is kept at 5,000 warheads! Besides, this seems to be one of the reasons that Washington is now clearly rejecting the idea of a merger of the two negotiations, although it may have considered it for a time.<sup>10</sup>

In spite of this, we can see no other solution to this problem but the merger. All the more so as, if the negotiation was enlarged to include U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles, independently of their geographical location (and with a specific sub-ceiling for these weapons), it would make it possible to take into account systems such as the SS-22 or the sea-to-ground cruise missile, which are now evading all controls.

In addition, and this deserves to be stressed, if the INF and START negotiations were merged into a single large negotiation on the nuclear arsenals of the two great powers, that would put an end to the concept of "regionalization" of the balance of nuclear forces which is implicitly contained in the present approach and is extremely detrimental to Western interests. When it was introduced four years ago at the start of the separate INF negotiations, this "regionalization" was not only contrary to the spirit of the SALT-II treaty (signed in 1978), which provided for a single global negotiation (SALT III) to follow, but above all it was in absolute contradiction with the NATO strategic doctrine. Indeed, NATO has always rejected the concept of a regional balance of nuclear forces; rather, it insisted on the idea of a dissuasion "continuum" between the traditional and nuclear forces deployed in Europe and the U.S. intercontinental arsenal. Another serious consequence was that, when Western powers started separate INF negotiations for purely political reasons, they enabled the USSR to gain a double advantage:

- on the one hand, the French and British forces had to be included because, "regionally," they belonged to Europe: in fact, the /range/ of the missiles then became the only important criterion, while the criteria of the /nationality/ and strategic or non-strategic /mission/ of these weapons were abandoned;
- on the other hand, based on the same argument, the USSR was then in a position to exclude its INF intended for Asia, something that was also explicitly granted by the United States.

Finally, one last detrimental consequence of the INF-START division is worth mentioning here: politically, a negotiation limited to Europe could only produce numerically equal "ceilings." But this equality requirement, which in the end caused the INF negotiations to fail, had not even been considered by the authors of the 1979 decision. Indeed, NATO never considered a one-to-one match of the number of Soviet SS-20 missiles; its goal was to restore the coupling between the European and U.S. territories through a limited number of weapons that could reach the USSR from European soil. At any rate, in this case too, the USSR did not fail to exploit this contradiction by putting forward its own concept of "equal security" corresponding to the sum of the various "regional balances," /plus/ equality with the United States as far as intercontinental missiles were concerned.

It is therefore high time to put an end to all the political and strategic inconsistencies resulting from the artificial separation of the INF and START negotiations. At any rate, the present suspension of the two negotiations provides a unique opportunity to restructure these negotiations into a single forum, which alone could lead to a satisfactory compromise.

As far as the problem of the French and British forces is concerned, and INF-START merger is the only formula that could offer, if not solutions, at least means to get out of the present deadlock. Let us consider two such means:

- the idea of making a distinction between the concept of right to numerical equality on the one hand and, on the other hand, the unilateral decision that the United States would make not to "fulfill" the quota to which they would be entitled (this distinction was already suggested by President Reagan in his speech at the United Nations in September 1983). Materially, this would mean that the number of Pershing and Cruise missiles deployed by the United States would be less than the number of Soviet SS-20 agreed to in Geneva (which, as we know, had been the intention of the authors of the 1979 NATO decision; the equality requirement came only later, precisely because the INF tended to become a "regional" negotiation distinct from the SALT talks);
- a compromise on the question of the /"throw-weight"/ (the carrying capacity of the missiles) at the START negotiations. At present, the Soviets enjoy an undeniable superiority in this field (thanks to their heavy missiles) and the United States cannot hope to equal this particular item of the balance of forces, either through negotiation or through their current strategic modernization program. This throw-weight gap could therefore be used as the basis for a compromise on the "compensation" of the French and British forces (excluding, for instance, any limitation on missile sizes in the context of the START negotiations).

Either of the two solutions could make it possible to break the difficult deadlock on third forces. On the condition, of course, that the Soviets agree to consider a compromise. This is a strategic decision if ever there was one, which involves the whole Soviet attitude toward East-West relations in years to come and which, therefore, goes far beyond the scope of mere arms control negotiations.

France, therefore, should try to promote solutions of this type during the next few months, and it should also recall that it is prepared to take part in a larger

five-power negotiation on strategic arms, like the one defined by the president of the Republic last September, but only if substantial reductions are first achieved by current negotiations.

Assuming that a satisfactory formula can be found to solve the problem of the inclusion of the French dissuasion force, France would still have to face a second set of problems; these would have to do with Germany or, more precisely, with an increase of our contribution to this country's security.

It is still too soon for a technical assessment of the operational value of the Rapid Action Force (its constitution and evaluation are still in progress), but we should be aware of the fact that it is not always assessed as positively abroad--and especially in Germany--as we would like to believe in Paris. If the creation of this force of intervention was generally well received in Bonn, as well as in NATO circles, it was mainly because of what it meant politically: namely, it showed a new determination on the part of France to really commit itself on the side of its allies. All the same, many German military experts feel that the operational value of the Rapid Action Force remains to be demonstrated (especially considering the relatively small number and the vulnerability of its airborne component) and some would have preferred to see France emphasize the modernization of its First Army which, when all is said and done, remains the only reserve force immediately available to NATO. The other criticism often heard in Bonn--and already mentioned before--is that the Rapid Action Force does in no way put an end to the fundamental ambivalence of the French strategic position between our country's commitment to its allies and its own nuclear maneuver. Indeed, on this point, the French line of thought appears most hesitant. When the Rapid Action Force project was introduced for the first time, French officials thought they should insist on the total uncoupling between the engagement of this force and the purely "domestic" nuclear maneuver. The trouble is that, in doing so, France indicated to its allies--and to the USSR--that its engagement would be restricted to the infra-nuclear threshold and would involve at most the 47,000 men of the Rapid Action Force (while the First Army could hold back to carry out the purely French strategic maneuver to protect the sanctuary). In fact, this amounted to a sort of unilateral statement that France would not be the first to use the nuclear weapon. Later on, having become aware of the inadequacies of such a position--especially if the goal was to "reassure" Germany--official statements became more ambitious, but not less confusing. The Rapid Action Force, it was said, would rush to fight "operational maneuver groups" of the Red Army and, besides, although it was not coupled with the nuclear weapon, using the Rapid Action Force still did not mean that any crossing of the atomic threshold was totally excluded. As General Lacaze was to point out in a somewhat embarrassed wording,<sup>11</sup> it remained "understood that the possibility of our participation (through the Rapid Action Force) would indicate to the enemy that, from now on, it is running the risk of an early confrontation with the forces of a nuclear country which, on the other hand, reserves its right to make independent decisions." In other words, the Rapid Action Force is "uncoupled" from nuclear weapons and at the same time "it is not."

Does this mean that the Rapid Action Force could be used as a /trip-wire/ to trigger French nuclear fire, just as the 300,000 U.S. GIs in Germany are supposed to trigger U.S. nuclear weapons?



But, in that case, have we not already reached a state of "enlarged sanctuarization," so dear to Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, and even a sort of "French-type graduated reprisal"? But if this were the case, what weapons would we use? Our tactical weapons which would hit German soil (certainly a comforting thought for the ally to whom we want to give a feeling of security), or our anti-city strategic weapons? But, then, would we be credible in the eyes of the Kremlin leaders? Would they really hesitate to "confront" us physically when we would have put ourselves in an all-or-nothing situation to protect something that was not the national sanctuary?

How can we hope to be credible in the eyes of Germany--and the USSR as well--as long as these questions have not been formulated clearly and resolved through adequate weapons programs and effective operational procedures. In other words, it is not enough--and it may even prove dangerous--to mention, even vaguely, situations in which we might choose to use the atomic weapon, when we really have no such choice. It is even more dangerous to do so as long as our defense officials have not yet overcome that sort of mental and nearly religious block according to which dissuasion can only involve purely nuclear means ("the non-battle") and massive reprisals. Such an attitude is already highly questionable when all that is at stake is the protection of the national sanctuary, as it places dangerous restrictions on the options offered to the president of the Republic in time of crisis. It will certainly prove untenable if France intends to contribute effectively to the defense of the FRG.

Apart from that, we still do not want to underestimate here in any way the progress represented by the creation of the Rapid Action Force in our capacity to share in the defense of Europe. But we should realize that the fundamental ambivalence of our strategic position remains entire and, as long as this is the case, we cannot hope to really "reassure" our German partner. Just as it would be naive to believe that West German opinion could be mobilized again around the Pershing missiles, it would be an illusion to hope that the 47,000 men of the Rapid Action Force could solve that problem.

Therefore, all this requires more thought and a more thorough debate in France on the question of how far we are really ready to go in our contribution to the defense of Europe, especially as far as our atomic dissuasion force is concerned.

The only possible solution to the problems posed by European security in the next few years will, indeed, of necessity involve a revival of the ideas of intra-European cooperation with respect to defense, without any complexes nor taboos of any kind, and this revival should be accompanied by a revival of the EEC after the Athens summit.

On this point, after multiple contacts with his German and British counterparts on questions of security, and therefore after assessing the problems encountered in this field, the president of the Republic is understandably prudent. In November 1983, he stated his hostility to any "redistribution" of the nuclear decision-making power (in favor of Germany). But he added: "I cannot change the fact that I have a nuclear force at my disposal, which can only be a dissuasion force to protect France and its vital interests... but which cannot purport to ensure the defense of Europe. I merely ask that we should consider the idea of European defense, and that we should proceed wisely."



The whole question is to know whether we have enough time to be so wise, or whether, on the contrary, the time has now come for a large-scale initiative, even if that means overthrowing a few taboos--especially on Germany's access to nuclear responsibilities--and a French consensus that is as ambivalent as our present strategic position.

The political conditions at any rate seem to be met. Abroad since, now that the Pershing initial deployment is over and the principle of a new balance of forces is established, it is both possible and necessary to resume the East-West dialogue and give new momentum to Europe. And at home where both the opposition and the Socialist Party are showing renewed interest for the concept of "European defense," which at any rate shows that most French political leaders have become aware of the new factors involved in European--and French--security. Here lie the bases of a new French consensus on a resolutely Europe-oriented defense policy that would replace the /apparent/ "Franco-French" agreement on defense which in fact covers diametrically opposed interpretations of the magic words of "independence" and "deterrence." In spite of what some will say, both among the right and among the left, "independence" is not the same as armed neutrality; and "deterrence" does not mean we should wait until the Red Army crosses the Rhine to hit Leningrad and Moscow. Such a view would amount to a suicide in time of war and to a political disaster in time of peace, because of the impact it would have on our European allies.

Therefore, it is now urgent for us to get together with our British and German partners to study--first bilaterally, then trilaterally--the means of effectively restoring the credibility of nuclear dissuasion on a European scale, through the French and British nuclear forces, and of implementing a real complementarity of the three countries' military programs. Such an initiative, together with a decidedly political revival of Europe, is the only way to recreate the bases of the European security system of the years 1980-1990. All Europeans are well aware that they can no longer choose to come back to the "pure" Atlantic system of the 1960's. Unless they accept--as some already do--the Soviets' idea on what the post-Yalta "European collective security" system should be (denuclearization plus progressive neutralization of the various West European states), the only road that remains open, which is also the most difficult, goes through intra-European cooperation in matters of defense, parallel to whatever will remain of the U.S. presence and "guarantee."

Now, in the post-Pershing Europe, only France is in a position to take an initiative of such scope and the forthcoming European election campaign is a good opportunity to submit the debate to public opinion. The question boils down to knowing whether the French, who rightfully fear the Germans' fear, will be strong enough to overcome their own inertia as well as that of others. Or whether, after going part of the way (on the euromissile issue and with the Rapid Action Force), they will back out when faced with domestic and diplomatic difficulties, and withdraw behind the wall of their nuclear citadel. That would then be the end of Europe, at least post-war Europe. And in that case the threat of German neutralization would materialize.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. This is why the Soviets never seriously considered accepting the ideas which the U.S. negotiator, Paul Nitze, expressed in what was later called the "stroll in the woods." (On this, see my analysis published in LE POINT dated 11 July 1983). This was also confirmed quite explicitly by the Soviet negotiator, Yuri Kvitsinsky, in a violent diatribe against his U.S. counterpart, published in the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 13 January 1984.
2. See: foreword to "Pacifisme et dissuasion," in the series "Work and Research at the IFRI [expansion unknown]," IFRI/Economica, 1983.
3. January 1984.
4. Refer especially to statements made by Kenneth Adelman, ACDA director ("Adelman Wants Nuclear Talks to Stay Separate," WASHINGTON POST, 7 December 1983), and Caspar Weinberger at NATO ("NATO Ministers Reject Merging Talks," WASHINGTON POST, 8 December 1983).
5. Whence the particular importance assumed by the start of the Stockholm conference on European disarmament. The only channel of communication still open in the field of East-West negotiations on security after the initial Pershing deployment, the Stockholm conference will enable the two great powers to "take the political temperature" of Europe and thus adjust their positions on the possible resumption of the START-INF tandem negotiations.
6. Many French people--Valery Giscard d'Estaing was not the only one--always wanted to believe, mistakenly, that Moscow was placing dialogue with France above its relations with Germany. Actually, the road to Paris has consistently been used by post-war Soviet diplomacy as a way to reach Bonn, the USSR's priority strategic objective in Europe.
7. As is known, Yuri Andropov had actually offered an immediate reduction of the number of his SS-20 based in Europe to the level of the French and British forces; the excess would have been destroyed.
8. See Francois Mitterrand's TV interview in "The Hour of Truth," published in LE MONDE, 18 November 1983.
9. This amendment was adopted by the Senate right after the SALT-I agreement (which gave the Soviets higher armament "ceilings" than those given to the United States); it requires that subsequent agreements of this type provide for numerically equal ceilings.
10. The other reason given in Washington is that the United States fear "interferences" from their European allies concerning the negotiation on their strategic weapons, should the START and INF negotiations be merged.
11. DEFENSE NATIONALE, June 1983.

## COMMENT ON GOALS, 'BOURGEOIS CONSCIENCE' OF KKE

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 6 Feb 84 p 4

[Article by Giannis Loulis]

[Text] "...the bourgeoisie tries to prove that our acquisition of even the mere potentiality for action at the governmental level will mean a change in the social order...."

V. Danilenko, NEOI KAIROI [New Times]

The discussion which began a few weeks ago about the ulterior aims and current tactics of the KKE is continuing. And there is nothing strange about this. Because the KKE--despite the fact that it is of course still outside the government--is becoming an increasingly important factor of "influence" in our political life. Naturally, this development is not unrelated to the policy of the Papandreou government vis-a-vis the orthodox communists. Because to a great degree it is thanks to the choices of the socialists that the influence of the KKE is expanding more and more in our country, with it having the prospect--as we have repeatedly pointed out in these columns--of ultimately becoming a controlling factor in our political affairs.

Of course the recent speech by Kh. Florakis in Salonica rekindled the discussions about the relations between PASOK and the KKE. Without holding any sensational surprises, this speech defined once more the immediate goals of the orthodox communists, and also to a degree its more long-range aspirations.

#### The Speech of Florakis

The speech of the KKE secretary general was brimming over with moderation and "understanding" towards the government, with it continuing and accentuating that which 2 weeks ago we called "an undertaking of mutual assuagement" between the KKE and PASOK. But let us look at the main foci of the speech by Florakis:

Firstly: Particularly mild criticism was leveled against the government. Thus, the KKE secretary general avoided accusing the government either of cooperating with the "Establishment" or of "betraying the cause of the

Change." On the contrary, there was simply talk about its "indulgence of the Establishment." At the same time, Florakis admitted that "we have had some more minor and some more major changes," to which he added, of course, that "we do not have the Change which was proclaimed." Also, even though he stressed that the present difficulties can be overcome by an uncompromising policy, he allowed magnanimously that "we are the first to recognize the great problems which the Right has left behind. The first to understand the problems which are created by the present economic crisis and the pressures of our domestic and foreign oligarchy...." This entire approach, this "understanding" on the part of the orthodox communists towards the government, is strictly part of the choice made to engage in "constructive criticism" which the 11th Congress of the party had approved.

Secondly: Especially harsh criticism was directed at the "Right." Of course, this criticism had the objective of showing that the KKE "sides" with PASOK against the "common enemy." Thus Florakis emphasized to his audience that everything would have been "worse" if the "Right" were in power ("there would have been more unemployment and harsher austerity, authoritarianism and full submission to American policy").

Thirdly: It was earnestly pointed out that the immediate aspirations of the KKE for the "Change" are only minimally "revolutionary." Thus, after first mentioning that the long-range goal of the KKE is the "socialist transformation of Greek society on the basis of scientific socialism (Editor's note: that is, of Marxism-Leninism)," Florakis hastened to assure PASOK and also the electorate that "the reality in Greece today dictates" simply that "immediate problems of democracy be solved." In short, the KKE secretary general made it clear that the "changes" which he is proposing are simply reformatory and not revolutionary. Within this framework, there was no talk about mass nationalizations, but merely about an economic policy which will "be based above all on the democratic sector of the economy." At the same time, the abolition of private enterprise was not called for, but instead "reliance on those private businesses, above all small and medium-sized firms, which contribute to increases in production and employment...." (Thus, the KKE is in favor of private enterprise, especially that of small and medium-sized businesses!)

Fourthly: Naturally no immediate demand was expressed for participation in the government. On the contrary it was made clear, as we have repeatedly pointed out, that by way of its "association" with PASOK, the KKE is aiming to strengthen its parliamentary position and consequently also its ability to exert an influence on future affairs of government. Thus, the KKE secretary general suggested that if in 1981 his party had been included in the second distribution, this would have meant "steps taken in the direction of cooperation among the progressive forces" (a "cooperation," evidently, which would have been dictated from a position of strength). For this reason, Florakis stressed that "genuine change" will "depend also on the power" which will be given "to the KKE to play the role which it rightfully has. The KKE needs to become stronger both in the Chamber of Deputies and among the people...."



Fifthly: The KKE's dedication to the value of freedom was stressed. Thus, Florakis stated that "communists and leftists, who are more familiar than anybody else with persecutions, know the value and the power of the freedoms of the people." And he added that the orthodox communists are struggling, among the other things, "to have them (the citizens) be able to freely choose their party without the restrictions which we have known...." (of course, the KKE secretary general does not explain to us how the multi-party system which it subscribes to is consistent with the "living socialism" and the "dictatorship of the proletariat" which it likewise subscribes to).

### The "Bourgeois Conscience"

With this speech by Florakis, the KKE appears as a bulwark of moderation, temperance, and also understanding with respect to the government. With an excess of deference, its criticism is that the government is making "changes" but not the big "Change." It gives tokens of having a full understanding of the "difficulties" which this government is facing. It fulminates against the "damnable situation" responsible for everything. It forgets (for the time being) the socialist transformation and is reconciled with the task of only solving the "immediate problems of democracy." It proclaims its faith in private enterprise and freedom. It calls for cooperation with the governing faction, but without demanding participation in the government as well. Why all these things? Unselfishness? For the "good" of the "Change"?

It is evident that the KKE hopes to gain benefits for the party soon from all these things. These include not only "key" positions in trade-union bodies. Nor only positions in organizations (for example, universities, public enterprises), together with opportunities for propagating its ideas and/or gaining access to centers of authority. Of course these "gains" pave the way for a broadening of the influence of the KKE in our society. But above all, through its cooperation with PASOK the KKE is aspiring to change the ideological climate in our country in relation to the overall image which it itself has. In short, to persuade more and more sectors of the public that any future participation on its part in the sharing of power is not something so very "threatening" but on the contrary is completely "natural." By way of the current "cooperative efforts on an equal basis" with PASOK on individual issues, the goal of the KKE is to have the acceptance of cooperation at a governmental level gain ground with the public.

A pro-governmental journalist who is disposed particularly kindly to the KKE (and the USSR) wrote a few days ago: "Today, following the mistakes of their infancy, the Greek communists are living and developing...in accordance with the laws of the bourgeois order, in an exemplary way.... Their only enemy is time and the bourgeois conscience. The two things are mutually dependent. These people know better than anyone else that time is neither gained nor shortened without broad popular approval and participation. And they know that this popular approval and participation is ensured only by a change in conscience...." For this reason, he concludes, the KKE is aspiring to (extra-governmental) cooperation without pressing



for more things. But what does all this mean in more blunt terms? Very simply, that the KKE knows that at this moment the "bourgeois conscience" (that is, the "conscience" of the vast majority of Greeks) would not want the orthodox communists to enjoy governmental power (even with others). Thus what is needed is "time" to "change" this "conscience." Therefore the goal of the KKE is precisely this "changing" of the "conscience" of the public, or in other words the overturning of the existing ideological climate, which is opposed to the idea of the KKE rising to governmental power.

But how can this overturning take place? Firstly, cooperation between the KKE and PASOK on as many additional levels as possible slowly but surely strengthens the impression among the public that an extension of this cooperation is natural, leading at some stage to a governmental coalition. Secondly, this prospect is facilitated further by the KKE's projecting of a moderate image--something which explains also the systematic effort in this direction which Florakis mapped out in Salonica. In his speech, the KKE secretary general did nothing but reiterate assertions which were made recently by the Soviet NEOI KAIROI. That is, according to this Soviet periodical the participation of communists in governments does not mean "a change in the social order" and will not have "effects on the freedom of the petit bourgeois to dispose of his capital" (see the statements concerning small and medium-sized businesses and private enterprise by the KKE secretary general). Thirdly, the "bourgeois conscience" which the KKE "fears" will "change" gradually as the latter receives its ideological "legitimation" by the socialists, who will bestow on the orthodox communists the title "democrat" and "progressive." But when, according to PASOK, the KKE is democratic and progressive, why then should it not participate some day in a "coalition" government of "democratic-progressives"? Finally, KKE-PASOK cooperation at various levels (unionist, and so forth) will facilitate defections from the latter to the former and give the KKE the hope that at last it will be able to insist on having a presence in the government ("the role which it rightfully has").

Thus all these things make it clear what the KKE secretary general and the orthodox communists are aiming at. With the passage of "time," slowly but surely and with the help of the governing faction, it aims to "change the bourgeois conscience," thus paving the way at some stage for the acquisition by KKE of a share in governmental power.

12114  
CSO: 3521/189

## POSSIBLE NEW POLITICAL PARTY (MAD) ORGANIZES, DEFINES STRATEGY

Lisbon O JOURNAL in Portuguese 27 Jan-2 Feb 84 p 13

[Text] Notwithstanding prior speculation in the press, the question as to whether the MAD (Movement for the Study of Democracy) would turn itself into a regular political party did not even come up in the speeches at the movement's two-day Second Plenary Session in the Great Lecture Hall of the School of Economics at Porto.

In the present circumstances (so goes the consensus among the top-ranking leaders of that lobbying movement), this question is not even under consideration, although allowance has been made in some public declarations for the possibility that MAD might someday have a role to play in some new party development.

The one thing certain is that the plenary gathering, chaired by Jose Carlos de Vasconcelos, marks the real organizing meeting in the short history of the organization, lending structure to the movement, since bylaws were approved and proposals presented for its expansion into regional areas. A proposal on the movement's strategy and lines was also approved by consensus.

A succession of local representatives each took their turn at the podium, including delegates from chapters in Aveiro, Braga/Guinmaraes, Coimbra, Evora, Lisbon, Oporto, Santarem, Setubal, and Beja. Faro sent word that no one from there could come because of schedule conflict with the Algarve Congress. Portalegre sent a message.

Possible participation in presidential campaigning

Another polemical question that has had much press coverage was the possibility of eventual support for a presidential candidate. Observers' interests were whetted by the fact that Engineer Lurdes Pintasilgo, MAD's number one figure, is herself an eventual presidential possibility. In statements to reporters, moreover, she has neither confirmed nor denied such a hypothesis.

A small group of members, led by Strecht Ribeiro, presented a motion at the plenary session in favor of active participation in the presidential election process. This would implement a resolution of the National Coordinating Committee which would have MAD participate in the "national debate on the next presidential elections, calling attention to the political and ethical criteria that ought to govern the selection of future candidates." Lurdes Pintasilgo would declare that "the MAD is not a launching pad for any candidacy." Politically, the high point of the plenary gathering, attended by 200 members, was Pintasilgo's speech, in which the former prime minister defined MAD as a "movement of political outreach." The MAD, she said, is seeking to establish a "new proposal for Portuguese society" on the road to a political and ethical renewal. "A challenging proposal, with a totally new culture and political practices," she suggested.

#### Abortion: Criticism of Discussion Methods

The plenary gathering managed to come up with a resolution on the issue of abortion that could be passed (unanimously, like every final resolution). Instead of a proposal that gets to the bottom of the problem, MAD turned its criticism against the way that "the issue of abortion and more concretely the decriminalization of the voluntary interruption of pregnancy is being dealt with at the present time." "Such a very serious social problem cannot be left to political jockeying or power brokering," the resolution states and goes on to say, "MAD proposes that there be study, debate and discussion as to the consequences of the necessary decriminalization of abortion, all directed toward creating the social conditions that might liberate women from recourse to interruption of pregnancy, within the context of a responsible exercise of motherhood and fatherhood."

#### Two Lists

Two lists contested the first election for the various committees established by MAD's bylaws. There were no real program differences between the two slates, which otherwise had various names common to both.

The second slate apparently got put up because the first one, which had been introduced by the outgoing coordinating committee, had left off the name of Strecht Ribeiro, whom some members considered representative of an important "sensibility" of the movement. After the elections, the minority managed to get their way by having the name of the Porto lawyer included through application on the Hondt method.

List A had 87 votes for the Coordinating Committee and 84 for the plenary's head table, and List B won 29 and 31 respectively.

Among the members elected to the new National Coordinating Committee are: Lurdes Pintasilgo, Jose Carlos de Vasconcelos, Alberto Martins,

Fonseca Ferreira, Fatima Gracio, Jose Roseira (common to both lists), Nuno Grande, Teresa Santa-Clara Gomes, Rui Oliveria, Emilia Reis, Rui Gunha, Joao Lourenco, Diogo Duarte, Rui Madeira, Isabel Faria, Conceicao Moita, and Strecht Ribeiro. The new plenary head table consists of Prof Henrique de Barros (who sent a greeting to the plenary gathering), as well as Caceres Monteiro, Jose Antonio Braga da Cruz, Alvaro Marques (common to both lists), Joaquim Calhau (who is also a member of the secretariat of the CGTP/IN), and Jorge Delgado.

12430

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## SCHMIDT CONCERNED FOR ARMY'S CONFIDENCE, MORALE

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 10 Feb 84 p 6

[Article by Ex-Chancellor Helmut Schmidt: "Politics and the Bundeswehr"]

[Text] Because of a succession of scandals, mistakes, and missed opportunities, the Kohl government presently is in much the same battered state the Erhard government was about 20 years ago. In the end, Ludwig Erhard was ousted by his own party without regard to his previous achievements after just 3 years in office. The present chancellor might suffer the same fate, if he fails to muster the necessary decisiveness inside and outside the country in time. We will have to wait and see—but the chancellor must be aware in any event that the Woerner-Kiessling controversy has essentially become a Kohl controversy.

## The Future of the Bundeswehr

The future leadership of the Bundeswehr and the defense ministry is of greater importance at this time than the future of the Kohl government. A number of political figures and military men have initiated a rethinking process both in Bonn and inside the armed forces which focuses on the question of whether primary responsibility for personnel matters should not be vested in the chief of the general staff and whether the top army, navy and air force staffs should not be taken out of the defense ministry and raised to the level of independent military command agencies.

There are several sources for this type of thinking. On the one hand, there are some people both inside the government and the chancellor's office who would like to reorganize the defense ministry and thereby create the impression that there have been some consequences drawn from the scandal. On the other hand, several hard-nosed FDP political figures (ranging all the way from Mende to Moelleman) have been thinking along these lines for 30 years—particularly because they thought they might win personal favor with the Bundeswehr thereby. Thirdly, there is indeed a recurrent trend inside the military itself to try and regain at least partial or gradual independence. The last time these tendencies came to the fore was in 1966 on the occasion of the so-called union edict under von Hassel and again in 1967 under Schroeder on the occasion of his (unconstitutional) deputizing his civil service state secretaries to assume command functions.



In 1956, article 56 of the Basic Law vested "command authority" in the person of the minister for defense. The intent was to make it impossible that a specifically limited, purely military "command authority"—such as was created by Seeckt in the early twenties at the expense of the then Reichswehr minister—might constitute itself below the level of the minister who is politically responsible to parliament. In 1956, the FDP did not vote for this amendment to the military constitution which received the support of both the CDU/CSU and the SPD at the time.

There is no purpose in bringing up the debates of that time now. To be sure, the Bundestag never did pass a Bundeswehr "organizational law" as had been intended. But then again it is not really needed because the top management which did emerge is just as lawful in principle as that of the ministry of transportation or any other ministry—and for another thing, it works. Any attempt to institute major changes (aside from closer professional supervision of the counterintelligence service) would only get the army back in the headlines without doing any real good. The Bundestag, for that matter, would have every reason for opposing any such move.

To strengthen the Bundeswehr's confidence in the government, there is a need for the careful and sensitive discharge of his duties on the part of the defense minister and the chancellor under whose supervision he operates. As for the chancellor himself, he must stay within the bounds to which he is subject under the Basic Law with regard to his authority over the Bundeswehr (except under article 115b of that law which governs the procedures in case of an actual attack). The chancellor and the minister need to be aware of the fact that rational management is based on teamwork; but the defense minister must take responsibility both on the inside and the outside for the decisions he reaches in conjunction with his state secretaries and the chief of staff.

#### Strengthening Confidence Once Again

A lot has been missing over the past 6 weeks. Within a brief period of time, the Bundeswehr has been disappointed by both major political parties. To start with, a handful of social democrats raised suspicions during the deployment controversy that their party might return to the include-me-out position thought to have been overcome long since. And then, a handful of CDU political figures raised the suspicion that they neither understood our own military nor the role played by their party's leaders. Both of the political parties must make an effort to strengthen the confidence of the military once again. The military is entitled to it. One cannot but feel for them.

The fact is that the Bundeswehr is not only the best peacetime army from a military standpoint which Germany has had during the past 100 years; it is also the most democratic and unqualifiedly loyal army. The loyalty of the civil service organizations is distinctly less impressive. To lay the whole

affair to rest, General Kiessling himself performed a remarkable act of loyalty. All this deserves to be recognized—even if one does not care for the way in which the antiquated Wilhelminian concept of "an officer's word of honor" was bandied about in the public debate about the affair.

Count Baudissin may have gone a little too far, if in fact he actually said that "if this affair is not settled rapidly, there is a danger that the military might return to the state-within-the-state concept." Still, it is correct to say that the two major political parties must act positively in order to prevent any potential threat of this sort."

9478

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## MILITARY ASSESSMENT OF 'WAR GAMES' STRATEGIC RISKS

Paris LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE in French 6 Feb 84 pp 40-41

[Article by Gilbert Pointout: "War Games" French-Style"]

[Excerpt] "It is a well-made movie in which I have found a few errors." Cold sweat.

## Anguish

The man who calmly made this evaluation is Eric Hayat, deputy director of Steria, one of the top French software companies. "Obviously, the writers of 'War Games' know a lot about the computer field. And it is true that once an individual has in-the-clear access to the machine, we can expect anything," added Gen Pierre Quentin, chief of the Methods and Action Techniques Division of the Army General Staff, with particular responsibility for computer services.

Worry becomes anguish. Does everything then depend upon a supersophisticated system of microprocessors? Are France, Europe and the United States subject to malicious manipulation? "No," say the experts in total unanimity. It is not that easy. In fact, the entire credibility of the movie rests upon coincidences and confusions which are not noticed by the uninitiated. A closer examination of the brilliant young high school student's modus operandi brings to light all the weaknesses of the demonstration.

1. Our budding programmer has his computer dial all the telephone numbers of a specific exchange and winds up discovering the line of the Crystal Palace computer. Thanks to a signal converter known as a modem [modulator/demodulator], anyone can engage in this kind of search and identify another computer. In this way, it can "stumble" on an army computer but only a management or simulation computer. Only these computers are hooked up permanently or temporarily to the telephone network. In France, "the strategic computer system is closed and utilizes a specific communications network. Without a physical connection to the outside, it is impossible for anyone to penetrate the system," General Quentin says.

2. Our young computer programmer penetrates the system by going through the "back door," using a password parallel to the encrypted algorithmic lock. In effect, this back door does exist. "When a program is written, we must have

a personnel access system, a secret code which permits the testing of the program. The man who wrote the program can always penetrate it," Hayat admits. "The officers who perform maintenance on a system have access to it," General Quentin confirms. However, "the keywords are confidential and are changed frequently."

3. Our genius programmer talks in the clear with the computer. "Supposing that the first two stages could be bypassed by a person from the outside, this individual would read nothing on his screen except a series of absolutely incomprehensible figures and letters. Everything is encrypted in accordance with almost perfect encryption procedures," Gen Quentin emphasizes. What is more, "the computer requires authentication from the caller, who cannot make a mistake, under penalty of being disconnected."

4. The computer, disturbed by our programmer, projects signals on the screen and thus triggers a state of alert.

#### Simulation

"This is where the movie goes off the track," Hayat says. "The young man gains access with nothing more than a simulation program. In no case, and nowhere, can anyone link simulation program to a command program: the computers are not the same, do not speak the same language and, therefore, cannot communicate with one another." "That is true," Quentin adds. "We separate simulation from real, validated data."

5. Finally, desirous of playing the game, the computer decides to live its own life and, in spite of countermands, orders the launching of missiles. "It is not possible for the machine to act on its own, for it to override an order. Of course, as the result of a technical malfunction, a computer can go haywire. In that event, all we have to do is disconnect it, and other computers will take over," Gen Quentin recalls.

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## STEGER'S PLANS ON TAXES, ENERGY, FPOE

Vienna PROFIL in German 20 Feb 84 pp 14-15

[Article by Alfred Worm, OeVP member of Vienna city council: "The Explosive Plans of Norbert S."]

[Text] In the face of impending election defeats in the Laender, the trade, commerce and industry ministry of FPOe Vice Chancellor Norbert Steger is coming up with ideas a mile a minute.

Vice Chancellor and Minister for Trade, Commerce and Industry Norbert Steger is playing with fire.

"I am not the one who is applying pressure," he says. "In fact, I myself am under pressure from various quarters."

Pressure from the left; pressure from the national-liberal camp and pressure from industry. Although "the debate about this is not yet over," Steger has made a decision to join battle with the chamber of commerce.

The point at issue is the contribution paid by business to the chamber which is presently being collected by the tax authorities and then turned over to the chamber.

Steger wants to have the chambers of commerce collect these contributions themselves in the future—"just like the religious denominations."

"Now that the assessments have been raised, the government is being blamed for something that does not even belong to it," Steger says. "Business is complaining all over the place that it has to pay hundreds of millions more than before. And we are the ones who are on the spot."

"As part of a tax reform package," as Steger puts it, State Secretary Holger Bauer will therefore be asking the chamber in the spring or by summer at the latest to do its own collecting among the member firms.

"That is totally out of the question," says chamber president Rudolf Salingner tersely. "That would shake the very foundations of our social partnership."



But since these contributions which the finance minister is presently collecting amount to more than 3 billion schillings a year, Steger is willing to risk a fight with Sallinger. "After all," he says, "the internal revenue service does not collect church taxes either."

As a trade-off, Norbert Steger is willing to let the existing foreign trade departments of the chambers continue to operate for the time being. "I really do not want to think about any changes as yet," he says.

But last year, when he did do some thinking, Steger seriously considered having the government take over the chamber's foreign trade operations.

"These foreign trade operations are a good thing," he now says. "We reached an agreement that they would remain untouched for now—and I am going to honor that agreement."

He will do so because the FPOe thinkers have a few other ideas up their sleeve anyway.

For instance as concerns the tax reform package.

Holger Bauer, the FPOe state secretary in the finance ministry, is currently cooking up some interesting tax alternatives which, in his eyes, are in conformance with liberal doctrine.

The FPOe plan calls for equal treatment of the employed and the self-employed which would permit both groups to assess themselves and take advantage of writeoffs.

On the other hand, the FPOe would like to see a "withdrawal tax" introduced—which means that the self-employed are taxed on a sliding scale only on what they withdraw in funds from their business for their own use. His "long-range goal," Steger says, is not to tax profits which are re-invested.

"Based on the government coalition agreement with the SPOe," Steger says, "it is our plan to simplify the tax laws and to make them more equitable and efficient."

His ministry is already working on a large-scale "house cleaning" operation. A working group, composed of representatives from business, labor and the government, is to come up with a thorough review of the small business subsidy apparatus by the end of 1984 so that "a genuine debureaucratization of the economy" can be accomplished, Steger says.

On the surface, this plan looks good; but there are pitfalls. It not only calls for simplifying the forms that need to be filled out but also for a wide-ranging liberalization of the regulations governing the establishment of new businesses.

But since the chamber of commerce has a big say in these matters, this might cause some friction.

There is another idea of Norbert Steger's which is somewhat explosive—the long-range tourist industry formula which is to take us up to the year 2000 and is to be adopted by October of this year.

Though still confidential, it is supposed to call for radical cuts in direct subsidies and instead for stepped-up government tourist advertising which is to benefit the entire tourist industry in equal measure.

It is an open secret that the ministry also has plans for new departures in other areas.

By June, the rough draft of a new energy program is to be ready which will call for the establishment of an inter-university, inter-ministry computer center (in collaboration with the energy utilization agency and the ministry for science and research). The computer center will use the "Markal" energy model worked out by the Paris-based international energy agency which optimizes energy utilization in lowest-cost combinations which are most advantageous to a given economy.

At the government level, the decision has apparently been taken to build the Hainburg facility, if the environmental protection agency approves the project. If the Lower Austrian authorities do not approve it, the political side of the issue is fairly clear. In that event, the OeVP will be blamed for the acid rain and for the construction of new coal-powered power plants of the Duernrohr variety.

The Zwentendorf nuclear power plant seems to have been written off once and for all. There are plans inside the ministry to work out an odd new referendum on the matter—which Steger "refuses to comment on." The populace is to be asked two questions: "Should the Zwentendorf power plant which cost 8 billion schillings to build be torn down?" or "should it be permitted to stand at an annual upkeep cost of 100 million?"

"The only thing I am prepared to say on the matter is that it is unacceptable in the long run to import energy at the rate of 50 billion schillings a year," Steger says.

Another matter Steger's ministry is focusing on is economic national defense.

A major objective is to put the energy supply question "on a new footing" in collaboration with the defense minister and to have the trade, commerce and industry ministry take on new responsibilities.

This also applies to the newly established Department VII for innovative policy headed by the FPÖ's Dr Elmar Walter. For the time being, the new department appears to have emerged victorious from its skirmishes with the small business chamber.

In any event, the chamber does not have the majority in the new body as it hoped it would. 51 percent of the shares of the new agency are held by the government (represented by the trade minister) and 49 percent by the representatives of the social partnership establishment—20 percent by the chamber of commerce; 20 percent by the chamber of labor and 4½ percent each by the OeGB and the conference of the president of the chambers of agriculture.

This agency has been set up as a "special corporation" where the owner's representative (in contrast to other such corporations) is not the finance minister but the trade minister.

Another news item emanating from the same source in the trade ministry is that a recycling agency—to be established as an association—is in the offing.

The aim will be to step up recycling on the broadest scale possible.

The purpose is to divert the attention of the FPÖ rank-and-file to some extent from the troubles facing both Steger and the party as a whole.

FPÖ general secretary Grabher-Meyer 2 weeks ago expressed grave concern about a possible FPÖ disaster at the Salzburg Landtag elections scheduled for 25 March and Steger is not too optimistic about the future either. "If we should lose our FPÖ seats in Salzburg, that would be a catastrophe," he says.

It would be a homemade catastrophe.

Just a few days ago, former deputy to parliament Dr Otto Scrinzi violently attacked Norbert Steger, accusing him of being totally incapable of leading a political party. This attack did not come as a surprise. Scrinzi, the father-in-law of Johannes Voggenhuber, the "Green" and "Citizens' List" Salzburg city council member, insiders say would like to establish a new political party with him. Which explains why he fired the salvos against Steger.

Unlike the other Laender, Salzburg's election law does not provide for a minimum percentage clause which makes it possible even for small splinter groups (such as the Green-Alternative-Citizens' List) to win a seat for a handful of votes at the expense of the FPÖ and perhaps win two more with the votes left over. This would eliminate the FPÖ from the Salzburg Landtag. At the moment, the FPÖ has five deputy seats and one city land councillor.

The FPÖ dilemma is complete in the sense that Waldemar Steiner, the head of the party in Salzburg, just 6 years ago went on the assumption that there will only be three political parties contesting elections in the Land. In the course of election reform talks held at the time, Steiner withheld FPÖ agreement to a proposal to add seats both in the Landtag and the government and thus has no one but himself to blame, if his FPÖ is catapulted out of the Landtag.

Steger therefore makes every effort he can to make up for electoral fiascoes by generating a lot of activity at the government level.

One fact, he says, "must certainly have gotten around by now. As far as the coalition is concerned, the SPÖ vouches for social peace and we supply the alternatives. By this time, no one can deny that!"

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## STUDY CRITICIZES CURRENT ECONOMY POLICY

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 2-3 Dec 83 p 10

[Text] Vienna 1 Dec 83--In a study on the Austrian economy of the 80's presented by the director of the Austrian Institute for Economic Research, Dr Helmut Kramer, many of the foregone conclusions on economic policy have been cleared away.

The study, commissioned by Creditanstalt-Bankverein, Austria's largest banking institution, is somewhat explosive from a domestic policy standpoint, although it is assumed that Hannes Androsch, the bank's general manager and former minister of finance, is using the critical analysis to pave the way for his return to politics.

The Research Institute criticizes traditional lists of economic-policy goals, particularly the fact that the goal of full employment is missing "to an unfortunately increasing extent." The institute also considers the structure for the flow of financial funds and transfers between individual sectors of the national economy to be unbalanced and problematic in view of the international banking crisis, thus consolidation efforts are absolutely necessary, particularly in the case of public budgets. Finally, Kramer contends that present foreseeable trends in the international division of labor have made substantial adaptations in the Austrian production apparatus "necessary and urgent."

The respected economic expert also criticized the unilateral orientation of Austrian monetary policy with regard to the deutsche mark: "It is still debatable how many more advantages (stability), money market confidence (partial structural changes) than disadvantages (loss of autonomy, partial competitive drawbacks) have been produced by the self-chosen relationship of Austrian currency to German currency and its associated inevitable reduction of the scope of monetary, income and budgetary policy as a whole." Kramer does not question the hard-currency option, but says that it is necessary to settle the matter of what change in the Austrian economic structure and in economic-policy patterns would be required for more effective autonomy.

In Kramer's opinion, the solution can be neither post-Keynesian theory alone nor neoclassical dogmas in the guise of monetarism, and certainly not a superficial Laffer-style supply-side experiment, applied for itself alone and nationally isolated. Kramer believes that a new economic-policy solution is necessary



in the 1980's and provides three key words for this: "Context of economic policy," "arrangement of economic policy," and "innovation."

Kramer considers the function of government in the economy and society, expressed somewhat by the sustained opposition to tax system reform or by the psychological downgrading of borrowing by the government, to be unresolved as yet. In his opinion, the increasing takeover of functions by the government is accompanied by a lack of institutional clarity. The government is supposed to be an economic promoter, credit broker and insurer of personal and business risks. For Kramer, other examples needing clarification of "national economic goals" are the labor market, educational policy, energy policy and expansion of energy production.

Furthermore, in Kramer's view the dogmatic orientation of the debate over FRG regulative policy has never met with much response in Austria. He believes that it has always been much too strongly oriented toward urgent needs of the moment rather than self-evident facts. In any case, basic considerations are lacking for social security, for distribution of income and wealth, for the government's influence, motivated by structural and regional policy, on investment, production and employment decisions of corporations, and also for competition between private industry and government corporations. The unfavorable trends in the sphere of social welfare and the cutback of available funds for stimulating the economy or for infrastructures, however, give cause for such considerations.

In Kramer's opinion, it is impossible to prove whether the view of the innovative weakness of the Austrian economy actually applies to the key word "innovation." Efforts in this respect should nevertheless be among the priorities for the 1980's, since our trade partners have been active in this area as well. Growth and employment can be increased, and thus autonomy in economic policy can be enhanced, with a more up-to-date economic structure. Special efforts should be made in regard to new technologies, particularly the new information and communications technologies, but it would also be necessary to promote consulting activities, which are so underdeveloped in Austria.

As before, moreover, Kramer points out that the direct presence of Austrian businesses in international commerce is strikingly small. He says that this is partly due to the fact that Austria was formerly not a location of large international industrial and service corporations. Efforts such as those of VOEST [United Austrian Iron and Steel Works, Inc.]-Alpine should be supported, as they could stimulate the productive output of other Austrian corporations. In Kramer's view, the exporting capacity of the large number of small and medium-size companies would have to be increased through suitable marketing and trade operations. The basic idea is to offer more goods and services with a higher value potential and the lowest possible price sensitivity. In addition, however, more appropriate forms of organization and the acquisition of adequately experienced and motivated personnel are also necessary.

## EEC MULTINATIONALS' COMPETITION FORCES BANKRUPTCIES

Athens ETHNOS in Greek 7 Feb 84 p 23

[Article by Kh. Anagnostopoulos]

[Text] At a rate of two a day, more than 664 shops went bankrupt and closed last year (compared to 553 in 1982 and 516 in 1981). Bills of exchange which were dishonored in 1983 reached a value of 3.3 billion drachmas (96,648 bills up to October) versus 45,699 bills worth 1.3 billion in 1982.

The data were announced in a press conference on 6 February by representatives from the newly-formed "movement for repulsion of effects from accession to the EEC." They stressed that the small and medium-sized businesses in our country (as in the rest of the EEC) are in a "state of bankruptcy." They attributed this picture to repercussions from Greece's accession to the EEC.

The main thing, they said, is the spectacular increase in imports with a simultaneous decrease in exports.

According to the data they gave, imports of pants from the EEC increased by 72,300 percent (!) in 1980 to 1981. For other items, the percentage of increase in imports is (the decrease in exports is in parentheses): Dressed leather, 777 percent in 1981 (10 percent); dressed furs, 654 percent in 1981; furniture, 90 percent in 1981 and 84 percent in 1982; shoes, 102 percent in 1981 and 70 percent in 1982 (8 percent decrease in exports in 1982); toys, 54 percent in 1981 and 19 percent in 1982 (6 percent decrease in 1982).

The representatives of the movement said that Greek businesses were unable to compete with the multinationals from the EEC and United States which maintain industries in African and Asiatic countries with a low labor cost.

The attitude and ambition of the multinationals, they said, is to downgrade the standard of living and degrade the Greek workers and small and medium-sized (shopkeepers, artisans).

The movement, they said, will work with labor and agricultural organizations to repulse the consequences from accession to the EEC.

## STATISTICAL EXAMINATION OF 1983 TAX EVASION

Athens TA NEA in Greek 7 Feb 84 p 1

[Text] Unofficial books and records were kept by 1,039 businesses. These were found last year by the Revenue Department which uncovered a total of 142,260 cases of tax evasion, in 1983 alone, in the transportation of goods and the services offered by free professionals.

This means that the tax control teams are uncovering an average of 390 cases of tax evasion a day.

More violations are being uncovered every year which means either that tax evasion is spreading, or the tax "claw" is becoming more effective, or, finally, that both things are happening.

In the last three years, the violations uncovered were: 53,853 cases in 1981; 65,562 cases in 1982; and 142,260 cases in 1983.

These data were announced on 6 February by Minister of Finance Giannis Pottakis. As emerges from these data, in 1983 unofficial books and records were seized in 1,039 businesses, while in 1982, unofficial books and records had been seized in 447 businesses, and in 303 businesses in 1981.

Most of the tax evaders "reside" in Athens, where 62,212 cases were verified in 1983. Second is Kavala, with 27,599 cases and third is Salonica with 16,417 cases. Tax evasion has also taken large dimensions in Patra and Kozani with 12,497 and 10,440 cases respectively.

As concerns businesses which kept unofficial books and records, 416 were in Athens, 237 in Salonica, 119 in Kavala, 103 in Kozani and the remaining 162 were in Patra, Larisa, Tripoli and Irakleion.

Mr. Pottakis reported as typical the following 14 cases of tax evasion: An anonymous textile company concealed sales worth 676,023,009 drachmas from 1978 to the beginning of 1982. A cattle-trading business covered up sales worth 728,572,303 drachmas from 1979 to the beginning of 1982. A business marketing dried fruits concealed sales worth 410,000,000 drachmas from 1978 to 1982. A cattle-trading company covered up sales worth 381,449,927 drachmas from 1979 to 1981. A company marketing domestic products concealed sales worth 398,000,000 drachmas from 1977

to 30 June 1981. An anonymous quarrying company overestimated its expenditures with counterfeit bills worth 40,000,000 drachmas. An anonymous goldsmithing company concealed sales worth 1,000,000 drachmas from 1979 to 1982. A private tile-manufacturing company declared an income of 16,740,952 drachmas from 1975 to 1982, though its income was 280,096,615 drachmas. A chick-producing business earned 134,115,154 drachmas from 1 September 1973 to 31 August 1982, but it declared 50,000,000 drachmas. A tourist-items industry concealed income worth [figures illegible] drachmas from 1979 to the middle of 1982. A readywear-clothing industry covered up sales worth 62,094,190 drachmas from 1979 to 30 April 1983. A private book-selling company concealed sales worth 42,248,600 drachmas from 1980 to 1983. A leather business, from 1 January 1980 to 20 May 1982, bought raw hides without invoices and with a total value of 64,119,083 drachmas, with counterfeit or fictitious invoices. We stress that the business not only did not pay any tax on this amount, but as an exporting company it collected from the public the median surcharge from indirect taxes, etc. it allegedly paid. A gold and silversmithing business concealed income worth 92,155,366 drachmas from 1980 to 1982.

The tax evaders were able to be located, stressed Mr. Pottakis, thanks to the very methodical work of the appropriate services, but also to the strengthening of the Service for Goods Movement Control (YPEDA) with a significant number of additional employees.

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## POWER CORPORATION PRESSURED TO BUY EAST EUROPEAN COAL

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 4 Feb 84 pp 4,5

[Article by G. Romanias: "DEI Pressured To Use East European Coal; Quality Unsuitable for DEI Plants"]

[Text] The multi member Greek delegation that has been in Moscow for many days is continuing its talks with Soviet representatives. The possibilities, from the Greek side's point of view, are predetermined by the need to broaden Greek exports to the USSR and to reduce our trade balance with that country. Among the subjects to be discussed is the possibility of the purchase of large quantities of Soviet coal to satisfy the needs of DEI and other Greek industries (Aget, Titan, Fertilizers, etc.). According to certain indications, the Greek side will try to satisfy the total needs of the country for the next 3 years through large purchases of Soviet coal. Because of this endeavor, certain very serious dangers are being created by the prospective importing of poor quality Soviet coal. More specifically:

1. The document under protocol number 7946 (1 Dec 1983) is very enlightening with regard to the intentions of the Greek side. This document was sent to the director of DEI by Mr K. Vaitzos, alternate minister of national economy (who also heads the Greek delegation in Moscow). In this document, the following is reported:

"It is known that DEI is developing into a large coal consumer. Naturally, it is advisable that with regard to coal, as with other materials under state allocation, foreign exchange expenditures be covered by the corresponding export of Greek products--whenever, of course, this is possible. Particularly in the case of coal, the promotion of Greek exports through state provisions in no way competes with materials that are under production, or could be produced, domestically.

"But the specifications for coal that have been used until now exclude many types of coal from Poland, the USSR and China, countries that can guarantee the above-mentioned benefits. Notably, these three countries account for 50 percent of the world's coal production and 35 percent of coal exports.

"Particularly in the case of Poland, the benefits become even greater if one takes into account the large debt of that country to Greece--which in essence constitutes an interest-free loan by our country to Poland.



"Therefore, taking into account the interest of our national economy, please examine every aspect of your technical needs so that the use of coal from the above countries is possible, even if this coal is mixed with coal from other sources, and make known to us your related actions."

2. What can be determined, first, is that the government confesses that DEI is becoming a large consumer of coal. It is particularly noteworthy that this development is observed during the tenure in office of a party that, as the opposition, criticized, often in frenzied tones, any attempt to import foreign coal to cover DEI's fuel needs.

3. The view that imports of coal as a substitute for Greek lignite does not compete with Greek products "which are being produced or could be produced" is a very questionable one. It must be made clear that the import of foreign coal can be imposed only as long as it substitutes for imported oil, but it is absolutely unacceptable if it substitutes for Greek lignite. The pseudo-dilemma that has been forming for a few months--"Should we mine Greek lignite now or should we leave it as a resource for the future?"--only constitutes a misleading maneuver. Indeed, a similar question has already proven wrong in theory and application in such a way so as to foreclose its reappearance. The instability of the term "energy fuel" means that tomorrow (in the short or long run) it may be possible, due to the emergence of new technology, that coal will not constitute "energy fuel." On the other hand, nothing excludes the opposite situation. But with the simultaneous discovery of large new coal deposits, there is no reason to abandon the use of coal today in order for it to remain as a resource for the future.

4. The minister in charge clearly confesses that the Polish debt is "large" and "in essence constitutes an interest-free loan by our country to Poland." This paragraph is a triumphant confirmation of the aid that the socialist Greek government (which calls itself democratic) provides to Jaruzelski's military regime. I think that more clarification must be supplied to the Greek people with regard to the composition of this loan, its purpose and its future progress.

5. The indirect but nevertheless clear governmental pressure on DEI to revise its current specifications so as not to exclude the purchase of "socialist" coal is also noteworthy. This ministerial intervention is considered unexplainable for two reasons:

a. DEI's specifications never name a concrete source of imported coal. They are based on objective characteristics and on related bids in which any supplier can participate regardless of the country of origin of the coal being offered. The attempt to reform DEI's specifications based on qualitative characteristics of coal from particular countries is novel, and;

b. DEI's specifications constitute an enumeration of the qualitative characteristics that imported coal is required to have so that its use in DEI plants is possible without causing damage. More specifically, it is well-known that there are serious reservations about mixed combustion because of construction

of the electric power plants, which burn lignite and not coal, which has five times the thermal power of lignite. It is obvious that the demand for 1,250 degrees Celsius as a lower limit of ash-softness as a condition for acceptance of the provided coal is supported by the fact that the accidental use of coal with a lower ash-softness point leads to clogging of the pipes, with unfavorable consequences for DEI's mechanical installations. Furthermore, the incident in which DEI imported unsuitable Soviet coal (400,000) without bidding is known.

c. Particularly with regard to the coal of the three prospective countries, the following is also noted:

1. Up to now, the Chinese have not participated in DEI's bidding. But those in charge at DEI have taken a negative view of a related document in which the Chinese report the technical characteristics of their coal.

2. The Polish participated in bidding announcement 053007, but they were subsequently excluded because the qualitative characteristics that they reported were noticeably inferior: very "thin" coal, low in aromatic compounds (below 30 percent), and a very low ash-softness point. According to the information I have, so far nobody in Greece has used Polish coal.

3. The USSR has not participated in any of DEI's bidding for the provision of coal. Only one Greek firm, Odysseus, participated in small-scale bidding for the acquisition of Soviet coal, which was subsequently rejected as technically unacceptable.

d. To illustrate the importance of the qualitative characteristics of imported coal, the following must be noted:

1. In DEI's bidding announcement 053007, coal that originated from a very good source was rejected. This case related to material of English origin, with high thermal energy--6,500 kcal/kg--and with a sulfur content below 1 percent. It was rejected, however, because of other technically inferior characteristics. It must be noted that the excluded firms (CTC Paris and Corry Coal Corp.) were low on the bidding scale (second and third).

2. Whatever DEI's choice of coal, it will include an estimate of the probable economic damage due to the exclusion of certain qualitative elements. Consequently, the Greek side must pay great attention so as to avoid any agreement that will limit DEI's right to choose the qualitatively appropriate coal. Nor can the actual characteristics of DEI installations be altered in any way because of the increased percentage of contribution of three countries to the world's coal supply.

e. Finally, the document's proposed use of a new mixture of inferior coal with coal from other sources is not compatible with what is already accepted in West Europe, where such a mixture must be tested experimentally for at least 2 years in order to determine its consequences before its use is permitted.

## MUMCU LOOKS INTO TEK SPARE PARTS PURCHASING

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 31 Jan 84 pp 1,6

[Text] Today we spring the lid on a file dealing with the Turkish Electric Power Enterprise [TEK]. The subject concerns the procedures used to purchase spare parts for the gas turbines of electric generating stations. The subject in one respect is fascinating; at the same time, it is something disturbing, increasing the discomfort of some of those involved.

In short:

Some of the money needed for the purchase of spare parts for gas turbines to be used in the Seydisehir, Aliaga and Bornova electric generating stations will be met by a \$25 million credit provided by the Italian Government within the framework of the OECD aid program; \$8.5 million of this credit has been transferred to TEK by the Ministry of Finance.

It is stated in article 41 of the "TEK Purchasing and Bidding Regulations" that "at a designated time, by means of advertisements and invitations, bids are delivered to the assigned purchasing agency. Bids are made in turn and each bidder after hearing others' quotations gives a more suitable price, bidding reciprocally against his competition. The result is the award of a contract to the bidder with the most suitable offer."

Two companies made offers to supply spare parts for the gas turbines. One of them was Fiat-TTG represented by Besta Company of John Benda, an Italian, and the other was Omega Industries International, Inc., owned by an Iranian by the name of Perviz Levi. This company's business in Turkey is run by Cenk Tuncay.

Initially, Fiat-TTG made an offer of \$12,220,815. This proposal was not found suitable by TEK authorities. In the first phase, TEK authorities, by refusing this offer, protected the interests of the treasury.

The truly interesting progress of the matter began at this point. In this same transaction, Omega made an offer of \$9,534,451. Observing these developments, Fiat-TTG in the face of this new development decreased its first proposal of \$12 million to \$8 million. The contract, however, was awarded to Omega Company's \$9.5 million proposal and the necessary "letter of credit" procedures for payment were initiated.

In this situation, there is a price difference of \$1.5 million. As the purchase of spare parts for 19 turbines is required, the difference reaches half a billion Turkish lira. It seems that the subject is multinational as well as multimonied.

Would it not be necessary for TEK, in accordance with article 41 of the above-mentioned regulations, to request another new offer from each of the companies to replace two offers that were widely disparate? In this way, a savings of half a billion lira would have been secured for the treasury and the proposals might even have been reduced below \$8 million.

But today the state treasury lacks this opportunity.

There are even more interesting aspects of this matter. Gas turbines are manufactured by Westinghouse of America. Fenni-Gama Company, the Turkish representative of Westinghouse Corporation, was not interested in this contract. The Omega Company is not working under license from Westinghouse.

The telex sent to Westinghouse Corporation on 27 December 1983 by TEK and answered by Dennis Podolny, department head of Combustion Turbine Systems of Westinghouse Corporation indicates that the Omega Company does not work under license from Westinghouse.

The Omega Company is offering spare parts only and is not interested in the repair business. This will inevitably create great problems in the future. Moreover, Omega is again proposing a 16-month timeframe.

Again, another interesting side of the business is the information that the Omega telexed bid was in "a more suitable condition" than the telex reply of Fiat-TTG to TEK authorities on 18 November 1983. When we directed questions on this subject to Mr Kamil Toktas, TEK general manager, our ability to obtain an official reply was closed by his statement: "I cannot elaborate."

The event, so it seems, is multifaceted. Profit motive struggles of two multinational companies can involve other points. We have not left a stone unturned concerning the file on which we have been working for days; we have met everybody related to the matter and have reevaluated the documents in our possession as a result of these meetings. In the course of these meetings, we telexed the Omega Company, whose head office is in America, about our desire for a meeting. Additionally, we conveyed our request for a meeting regarding the subject of gas turbines to a company official of Cenk Tuncay by phoning the company headquarters in New York. We have not received any replies despite the passage of 3 or 4 days.

After this, if we receive a reply for Omega, we certainly will publish that reply as well. Our purpose is to clarify the matter.

We see innumerable advantages to treating this matter from the beginning from the standpoint of "benefiting the treasury".

We have cracked the file, to open it all the way is now the duty of the authorities.

## WORSENING POLLUTION IN THERMAIKOS GULF

Athens RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 5 Feb 84 p 9

[Text] Salonica--Even the strollers along Salonica's beach run the risk of harming their health, because of the high degree of pollution in Thermaikos Gulf. According to recent measurements by the Health Division of the Medical School at the University of Salonica, children, young people, middle-aged people, and elderly people who move about along the new beach are in danger of contracting dermatitis. Formerly, the polluted Thermaikos had been affecting swimmers and those eating shellfish netted from the marine area around it. The people stopped swimming at the previously highly praised beaches near Peraia, Bakhtse-Tsifliki, Ag. Trias, and Mikhaniona. If one wants to enjoy the freshness of the sea and the sea breeze, he must travel to Khalkidiki. Likewise people stopped eating the fish and mussels of the Thermaikos. Now, the danger is spreading even to citizens who take a morning or afternoon stroll along Nikis or Neas Paralias Avenues. Tomorrow, who knows how far the consequences of this terrible pollution will extend?

The effects brought about so far by this pollution are known to everyone:

--The beach in this area has become dangerous to swimmers, who are forced to travel many miles in the direction of Khalkidiki to go bathing.

--The bad smells begin to appear at the beach in the summer, while the characteristic foul smells along 26th Oktobri Street last throughout the year.

--Salonica Gulf is constantly becoming more and more lifeless.

--There is a danger that children, young people, and the elderly who move about along Neas Paralias may contract dermatitis, according to measurements made by the Health Division of the APTh [Salonica Aristoteleion University].

--Salonica Gulf has become useless as a fishing and shellfishing area.

--Dead fish are washed ashore from time to time along the coast.



At the same time, the construction of the sewer-main system for the second capital is going intolerably slowly. The completion of this would help to finally bring to an end the practice of dumping the city's urban and industrial wastes into the Thermaikos and would pave the way for a future cleanup of the gulf.

#### Blockage by the World Bank

The process of construction on this large sewer-main project for the second capital began in 1977, with the expectation that the following jobs would be executed:

1. Basic drainage works (sewer-main system, seaside collecting drains, pumping stations, facilities for purifying urban wastes and industrial effluents).
2. Flood-control projects.
3. A network for collecting waste water and rain-water.

An agreement was signed that year with the World Bank--that well-known international state-monopoly outfit--concerning the granting of a loan valued at \$29.5 million, as part of the financing for the project. But as a condition for granting this loan, the IBRD nullified the original study and requested that a new feasibility study be drawn up having the terms, restrictions, and criteria which it set forth.

It is important to mention that included among these terms of the IBRD were provisions for indefinitely shelving the issue of biological purification and for keeping outside the network multinational basic industrial outfits such as ESSO, which dumps about 30,000 cubic meters of liquid wastes daily into the Thermaikos in order to avoid incurring additional expenses.

At that time the government of the Right accepted these objectionable and suspect terms and went on to conclude the agreement in 1978. This is an agreement which at best can be characterized as a colonialist one. And this is because whereas eventually it will defray a small fraction of the total cost of the project (scarcely 26 percent), it gives the IBRD the right to impose its unacceptable technical and financial terms.

#### Door is Opened to the Suzerains

The studies which were drawn up at that time are very casually done, even though they were in the making for 10 whole years. The consequence has been that terrible delays have been seen in the project and that the people of Salonica have been subjected to additional financial burdens because of the inactivity penalty clauses, with this charge amounting to many tens of millions of drachmas so far and with it being nothing but an extortive levy for money which has not been given.

Thus the government of the Right opened the door once more to the foreign suzerains and essentially became the agent for the World Bank in Greece.

This agreement had a 5-year term (1978-1983) and was to cover the construction work for the sewer-main system. Because great delays in the commencement of the projects have occurred--and their dependence on the IBRD has contributed significantly to this--the portion of the loan which had to be disbursed by the end of 1983 is very small in relation to the total amount of the loan. If we take into consideration the inactivity interest which must be paid for the disbursement delays, as well as the expenditures for bank consultants, foreign supervisory consultants, and so forth, the foreign exchange which has been spent so far above and beyond the labor work is probably greater than the loan which was received.

Recently the government negotiated a new loan from the European Investment Bank, the terms of which have not been made known. Who will eventually pay for the project? This is the fundamental question and problem in this affair. Will the people of Salonica pay for it, or will it be paid for by way of State subsidization through the program of public investments?

We believe that the expense of such a large project, which at current prices amounts to a total of 8-10 billion drachmas, must not be borne on the backs of the people of the city. The State is in a position to shoulder the expenditures for this project and the obligations of the loans, with it being able to saddle the industries with a part of the expense for this work.

As the situation has developed up to now, even under the best of assumptions the work on the sewer-main system cannot be finished before another 4 years at least. And therefore, of course, the polluting of the gulf not only will not be reduced, but will reach even greater dimensions.

Together with all these things, we must add also the serious problems which are being caused by the company EDOK-ESEP, which has undertaken the construction of that section of the tunnel for the sewer pipeline which lies within the city (Langada-Analipsi Street). This company is lagging terribly behind in its work. It is behind in paying its employees and has sunk a number of shafts in the central part of the city, even though the length of the tunnel which has been cut is very small.

This negligence on the part of those responsible is creating great dangers daily for the personnel and is causing an upheaval in downtown Salonica, especially for traffic, without there appearing at the same time any prospects that the project which it has undertaken will be finished. And at this point we should recall that EDOK-ESEP is one of the companies most over-indebted to the Greek banks.

Therefore it is essential that drastic and immediate measures be taken by the government, so that the work can proceed at a more rapid pace. And in order for this to happen, on the one hand what is needed is for there to be an ongoing financing of the project, and on the other hand the contractors who have undertaken the construction of its various sections should be forced to carry out the programs rather than be granted any more delays. Only in this way can the sewer be completed some day and the polluting of the Thermaikos be dealt with--a polluting which threatens to suffocate the entire city.

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